



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

May 29, 2020

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FOIPA Request No.: 1433273-000
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01626
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were
questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the
Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Ms. Polantz:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information.

Section 552

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure 6(e)

50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)

☒ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☒ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

300 pages were reviewed and 211 pages are being released.

- ☒ Deletions were made by the Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy. To appeal those denials, please write directly to that agency.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request and the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- ☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes

additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

Additional Information:

Please be advised that the Records Information/Dissemination Section (RIDS) is operating at reduced staffing levels amidst the ongoing COVID-19 national emergency. The enclosed FOIPA release represents a work product that could be generated for you under these unprecedented circumstances. We appreciate your patience and understanding as we work to release as much information, to as many requesters as possible, as this emergency continues.

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278)-2964 through FBI (19-cv-1278)-3263. The enclosed documents represent the seventh interim release of information responsive to your request.

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records. For questions regarding Parts 1, 2, or 3, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available at the web address.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010))]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **National Security/Intelligence Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A reasonable search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide and includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records. For additional information about our record searches visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheets. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **The National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626

FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000

PDF Title: 19-cv-1278 Release 7 Bates 2964-3263

Total Withheld Pages = 89

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 2997	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 2998	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 2999	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3000	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3001	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3002	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3003	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3004	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3013	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3014	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3015	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3016	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3017	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3018	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3019	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3020	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3021	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3022	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3023	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3040	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3041	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3042	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3043	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3044	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3045	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3046	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3047	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3048	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E

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Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 3052	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3053	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3054	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3055	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 3058	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 3060	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3061	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3062	b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3063	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3064	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3065	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3068	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3069	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3070	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3083	Referral/Consult

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
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Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 3085	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3086	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3087	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3088	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3089	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3090	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3092	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3093	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3094	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3095	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3096	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3109	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3162	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3200	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3201	Referral/Consult

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/16/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] BROWN, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed at WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, BROWN voluntarily provided the following information:

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(U) BACKGROUND

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] after searching online, she located an administrative assistant position at the CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST (CNI) and submitted an application.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN interviewed for the position with PAUL SAUNDERS, the deputy director at CNI, and had a second interview with DMITRI SIMES, though BROWN described this interview as "more just him talking" about himself and CNI. BROWN was hired as [REDACTED] to SIMES in March 2016.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that her primary roles at CNI included completing dictation on behalf of SIMES, for e-mails and other correspondence, and performing editing tasks for grammar and spelling, etc. BROWN explained that though English was not SIMES' first language, SIMES had "excellent vocabulary" and thought that her review of his writing was "not 100% necessary."

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that the job was "pretty easy," and that she was able to work full-time while in school part-time. BROWN also answered SIMES' phone and had access to both her own CNI e-mail and SIMES' e-mail. BROWN also regularly brought SIMES his lunch, which usually consisted of Chinese food and two (2) Sam Adams beers.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MAYFLOWER MEETING

(U//~~FOUO~~) When BROWN began at CNI, the Center was busy planning a "foreign policy speech" for DONALD TRUMP at the MAYFLOWER HOTEL in

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/16/2017
by [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of BROWN . On 10/13/2017 . Page 2 of 6b3
b7A
b7E

Washington, D.C. BROWN explained that this event was more or less planned by the time she began at CNI, as it went on as planned in April 2016. BROWN stated that the NATIONAL PRESS CLUB was the original venue for the event, but TRUMP's team believed it to be too "bland," resulting in the move to the Mayflower. BROWN stated that the event was primarily planned by the "magazine," the NATIONAL INTEREST, led by editor JACOB HEILBRUNN.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN explained that the magazine and the Center shared office space and sometimes had overlap with staffing, but that they functioned separately. BROWN stated that CNI was more "skeptical" about organizing the event, explaining that TRUMP, who was not yet the Republican nominee, was not the preferred candidate of the CNI (NFI), as CNI believed TRUMP to be a "controversial guy." Nevertheless, BROWN explained, the magazine and the Center maintained a close relationship, and the magazine would frequently "run stuff by" SIMES to "get his opinion on things." BROWN stated CNI experienced a "lot of turnover" as most of the staff was younger and there was "not a lot of mobility" for staff to receive promotions.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that a few days before the event, SIMES asked BROWN if she wanted to attend a "VIP reception" to meet TRUMP prior to the speech; BROWN stated she was not interested. BROWN stated SIMES was "respectful" of her declination, which BROWN stated she made on ideological grounds. The reception was held in an adjacent room to where the speech was made at the hotel and was more of a receiving line type of meeting. Though BROWN did not attend she stated that CANTELMO, an assistant director at CNI, did attend, as did a "decent amount of people," according to BROWN.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated she did not see [Attorney General] JEFF SESSIONS, JARED KUSHNER, or SERGEY KISLYAK at the Mayflower, but she knew from her colleagues that they attended. BROWN did see KUSHNER walking to the Mayflower as she entered the building. BROWN stated that SESSIONS and two notable supporters of CNI, and though she never saw SESSIONS at the offices,

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) CNI MAKEUP

(U//~~FOUO~~) As her time at CNI progressed, BROWN stated she got the sense that SIMES "noticed" her "political persuasion," which was not in line with that of CNI. BROWN explained that SIMES would make certain comments

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FBI(19cv1278)-2965

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] BROWN . On 10/13/2017 . Page 3 of 6b3
b7A
b7E

to her, such as "Isn't it crazy that people call SESSIONS a racist?" Such statements made BROWN uncomfortable, and she stated she believed this affected the trust SIMES had in her.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that while she was at CNI, SIMES was planning a trip to Russia; she stated that normally she handled all of SIMES travel, though with this trip she was tasked with "zippo" and was "way less involved" than she had normally been. BROWN stated that SIMES had hired someone else [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] was hired above BROWN and had a "pretty big title," but BROWN could not remember what it was; in any event, [REDACTED] was just below SAUNDERS, who in turn was beneath SIMES. BROWN stated the staff consisted of about 10 people, in addition to fellows and interns.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that most staff were American, but that accounts were predominantly handled [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] BROWN believed that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BROWN also stated an employee named [REDACTED] fluently spoke Russian and also worked at CNI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN reported daily to SAUNDERS, though she also had daily interaction with SIMES. SAUNDERS was fairly adamant about being notified of things before SIMES found out about them. BROWN stated that she was hired to eventually replace [REDACTED] who handled accounting among other things for CNI and left shortly after BROWN started there. BROWN stated that [REDACTED] told her about one incident in which SIMES "grabbed her arm" while [REDACTED] was in his office attempting to answer a ringing phone; SIMES later apologized to [REDACTED] for the incident. [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) DEALINGS WITH ADMINISTRATION AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN recalled having set up a meeting between SIMES and KISLYAK and stated that SIMES was always "really specific" about how he wanted things done; he was "very particular." BROWN stated that SIMES was seeking to have lunch or dinner with KISLYAK, and BROWN contacted the Russian Embassy directly. BROWN explained on the phone to the Embassy operator that she was calling on behalf of SIMES; the operator immediately transferred her directly to KISLYAK. BROWN stated that KISLYAK appeared "annoyed" that BROWN was able to get directly through to him and instructed her to call his staff instead. BROWN spoke to KISLYAK's

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-2966

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of BROWN . On 10/13/2017 . Page 4 of 6b3
b7A
b7E

assistant and provided some dates suggested by SIMES, which the Embassy added to KISLYAK's calendar.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN recalled a "bigger" event that she invited KISLYAK to on behalf of CNI; she recalled that there were two (2) separate invitations for two (2) separate events, and that the Embassy was confused and contacted SIMES. SIMES was not happy about the confusion. BROWN stated that SIMES and KISLYAK had a direct relationship and shared a "world view" as echoed by the policies of CNI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that she corresponded frequently with CATHERINE VARGAS, executive assistant to KUSHNER at KUSHNER COMPANIES in New York. BROWN provided a screenshot of an August 16, 2016 e-mail between herself and VARGAS referring to a 10:00 AM meeting on August 18, 2016 to be scheduled between SIMES and KUSHNER, held at 666 5th Avenue, 15th Floor, New York, NY. BROWN stated that this meeting did occur as she booked travel for SIMES. BROWN explained that PAUL MANAFORT was supposed to attend the meeting, but did not; he was represented by RICK GATES instead, who also attended the meeting. BROWN does not know the substance or purpose of the meeting.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN also showed a screenshot of an e-mail dated November 17, 2016, from VARGAS to BROWN; the e-mail was blank with the subject "SERGEY IVANOVICH KISLYAK." VARGAS called BROWN immediately after sending the e-mail and asked BROWN if KISLYAK was "the right guy to talk to." BROWN stated that both she and VARGAS were confused as KUSHNER did not provide VARGAS with specific clarity on the question; BROWN stated that she would ask SIMES directly. BROWN stated that VARGAS "thought it was strange" and stated that KUSHNER was "keeping it kind of hush hush," though BROWN explained VARGAS may have used a different expression.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN represented the question directly to SIMES via e-mail, which she also showed to agents, but received no response; BROWN stated that SIMES "handled it from there" and she never received follow-up from either SIMES or VARGAS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that she recalled reading about KUSHNER's "testimony to Congress" and stated that he could not remember KISLYAK's name; BROWN stated she thought this was inaccurate as it "didn't match" the conversation she had with VARGAS regarding KISLYAK.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that of all the CNI board members, CNI staff told her that if MAURICE "HANK" GREENBERG called, "you better answer." GREENBERG was apparently a very influential board member. BROWN

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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] BROWN . On 10/13/2017 . Page 5 of 6

stated that though she never met him, she remembered having seen a check from GREENBERG's companies, the STARR COMPANIES, payable to SIMES for "consulting fees." BROWN does not remember the exact amount but stated that it was "surprisingly large."

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN showed agents several other e-mails dated August 2, 2016 between SIMES and GREENBERG that she observed. The e-mails seemed to describe GREENBERG's desire to engage SIMES in getting assistance from KISYLAK and VLADIMIR PUTIN with regard to the "ITB situation;" GREENBERG appeared distraught and wanted to rectify the situation immediately. SIMES suggested going through PUTIN's economic adviser.

(U//~~FOUO~~) TERMINATION FROM CNI

(U//~~FOUO~~) Over time, BROWN explained, SIMES and SAUNDERS began giving her "less and less to do," which she interpreted as a "trust issue." SAUNDERS sat BROWN down on or around Friday, March 3, 2017, and began a rambling explanation as to why BROWN may not be a good fit for CNI. BROWN was fired at the end of the day.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that SIMES was not present when she was fired by SAUNDERS. BROWN believed that her firing was in part due to confusion she had generated with KISYLAK and the Russian Embassy as described above, but also due to a recent "phishing" e-mail she received from an apparent board member at CNI, which she opened. Immediately afterward BROWN called CNI's IT department, and then told SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS told BROWN she should have called him first. SIMES was reportedly "upset" at the incident as he had to then change all of his e-mail passwords.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that though fired on March 3, she had e-mail access to both her and SIMES' e-mails for several weeks afterwards. BROWN took screenshots of several e-mails using her iPhone on or around March 4, 2017, after she was fired.

(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that she has had no contact with SIMES since she was fired from CNI. BROWN spoke with SAUNDERS about unemployment benefits shortly after her termination. BROWN also remains in periodic contact with several current and former CNI employees [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) BROWN stated that she was contacted by a journalist on her cell phone the "same day" she was let go from CNI while she was at school. The journalist apparently knew she had been fired, leading BROWN

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of BROWN . On 10/13/2017 . Page 6 of 6b3
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
to believe that someone at CNI had told them. BROWN could not remember the name of the journalist but stated they were from a major US media outlet. BROWN was also contacted by the WASHINGTON POST several weeks later, though she did not communicate much information to them.

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BROWN remains amenable to further contact and agreed to provide via e-mail to reporting agents copies of screenshots of all e-mails referenced above.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On Wednesday, September 20, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of business, [REDACTED] Washington, DC, telephone number [REDACTED]. Present for the interview were DOJ Senior Financial Investigator [REDACTED] and FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from the Office of the Special Counsel. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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Prior to the interviewing parties asking any questions, [REDACTED] made a comment to the effect that he was expecting "us" to visit him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 09/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/21/2017

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] - September 20,
Continuation of FD-302 of 2017 (Grand Jury Subpoena [REDACTED]) . On 09/20/2017 . Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and that he would
request all documentation/records for the above-mentioned [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] was served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena (Subpoena
[REDACTED])

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/23/2018b7A
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Richard William Gates III was interviewed by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Gates' attorney, [redacted] of Sidley Austin LLP, was present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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b7CID Watchdog

The initial investment in ID Watchdog was from funds held in a Cypriot bank account in the name Global Sites. The funds were wire transferred from Global Sites to an account in the name of Jupiter and then wire transferred to ID Watchdog. Gates subsequently bought warrants in ID Watchdog from [redacted] To pay for these warrants, Gates took out a loan (Gates signed a promissory note) [redacted] and subsequently paid back the loan.

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b7CMcCain Campaign

During the John McCain presidential campaign, [redacted] a 501c (4) called Americans for Patriotism to support the McCain campaign. Gates stated he heard that a Paul Manafort controlled Cypriot account, LOAV, contributed money to the 501c(4), and the funds in the LOAV account were from Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch.

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Manafort and Rick Davis also set up a company, 3EDC, to provide social media/digital advertising support to the McCain campaign, and 3EDC received a percentage of the ad payments. LOAV fronted the money for 3EDC. Gates stated that LOAV was funded by Deripaska but Gates did not know if the money sent from LOAV to 3EDC was actually funds provided by Deripaska.

Submarine Deal

[redacted] worked with Manafort on the sale of two nuclear submarines from France to Pakistan. [redacted] was alleged to receive kickbacks from this deal and Manafort was paid between

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Investigation on 02/28/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/06/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Richard Gates , On 02/28/2018 , Page 2 of 7

\$250,000 - \$400,000 in kickbacks. Gates advised that these allegations were from a newspaper and he did not know if the allegations were true. Manafort never discussed this with Gates.

Energy Today

According to [REDACTED] Energy today was a company that [REDACTED] invested in and subsequently [REDACTED] also invested in. [REDACTED] had ties to Russia and Kazakhstan. [REDACTED] set up a telephone call between someone who worked at Energy Today and Gates where they discussed opportunities for Gates to conduct lobbying and PR work for the company. Specifically, Gates' role was to formulate a strategy to work with state government regulators to obtain oil drilling licenses and conduct PR/GR lobbying. [REDACTED]

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The owner of Energy Today hired [REDACTED] Gates and paid them approximately approximately 1.7 million shares of Energy Today stock. Gates stated that he [REDACTED] never actually performed any significant work for Energy Today. They developed a PR/GR strategy but they never actually reached out to any state government regulators to execute on their strategy. The plan was to initiate a pilot project utilizing the proprietary technology and then issue press releases about the pilot project to generate hype. However, they were never able to initiate any actual deals or projects. [REDACTED]

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Gates also attempted to secure investors from Ukraine to invest in Energy Today and obtain oil licenses to drill in Ukraine. However, Gates never obtained any new investors or licenses in Ukraine. Gates stated that the cost of the licenses in Ukraine was cost prohibitive.

[REDACTED] told Gates that if they could get the company two or three state ventures and execute on a PR strategy, the price of the shares would increase and they could sell the stock and make a lot of money, or conversely the company would get acquired and they would make money. Gates thought [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates stated he had

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Richard Gates, On 02/28/2018, Page 3 of 7

no reason to believe Energy Today was not a real viable company. In the end, the contracts never actually materialized.

The President of Energy Today and [] got into an argument, and [] told Gates and [] that he was making changes to the company and he needed them to return their stock so they could be exchanged for new shares in the new company. However, Gates never received any new shares. Gates utilized Morgan Stanley to facilitate these transactions.


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Gates described [] as a well-connected legitimate businessman who was constantly working on deals and meeting with legitimate executives such as the president of Sony Latin America. [] was always working on the next great deal.

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☐ Gates Plea

[redacted] initially called Gates and Gates called [redacted] back the Friday after Gates pleaded guilty to explain to him what he did and why he decided to plead guilty. [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Richard Gates , On 02/28/2018 , Page 5 of 7

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b7CCyprus Accounts

Manafort was aware of the Cypriot companies, Cypriot bank accounts, and that money was moving in and out of these accounts. Gates and Manafort had constant conversations about these accounts and the movement of money in these accounts. Gates stated they had hundreds of conversations about these accounts and the status of the money in these accounts. There were review sessions where they discussed which accounts had money and then Manafort would direct Gates where to transfer the money. These review sessions were usually conducted over the phone, at Manafort's New York apartment, DMP's office, or via emails. Moreover, Manafort directed Gates when to open new accounts. Then, Gates would contact [redacted] in Cyprus via telephone or email and would tell [redacted] that Manafort was instructing him to open accounts for him in Cyprus. [redacted] came up with the names of the nominee Cypriot companies controlled by Manafort.

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Gates worked with [redacted] (handled the day-to-day operations) in Cyprus. Gates initially met [redacted] through the political work DMP conducted for him in Cyprus. Deripaska initially introduced [redacted] to Manafort in 2007. The Ukrainian oligarchs instructed Manafort that he needed to open accounts in Cyprus in order to get paid. Manafort told Gates that [redacted] was responsible for setting up accounts in Cyprus for Manafort. Deripaska financially supported [redacted] [redacted] DMP's work for [redacted] Gates met [redacted] approximately 8 times in person in Cyprus. Gates went once with Manafort to Cyprus to meet with [redacted] to discuss political work and set up the Pericles structure.

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In 2012, Gates traveled to Cyprus at Manafort's direction to remove Manafort from the Cypriot bank accounts, certificates of trust, and incorporation documents and put them in either Gates or Kilimnik's name. Gates instructed Kilimnik to fill out the necessary documentation to place the accounts in Kilimnik's name and then Gates forwarded those documents to [redacted] to set up the accounts. Gates told [redacted] Manafort wanted his name removed from the Cyprus accounts because of the Tymoshenko lawsuit and he was concerned that she would locate his accounts in Cyprus. Gates stated there was no validity to Tymoshenko's lawsuit and that Manafort was not money laundering for Firtash. Although Manafort had his name removed from the accounts, he still controlled and owned the accounts. Gates also had Kilimnik travel to Cyprus once to open an account in his name so they could transfer money from Cyprus to Ukraine.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Richard Gates, On 02/28/2018, Page 6 of 7FBAR

Manafort told Gates that they did not need to disclose their foreign bank accounts because [redacted] and the people who work for [redacted] "layered them". Manafort advised that because they were not on the accounts from an "official point of view", they did not need to disclose these foreign bank accounts to their accountants. At some point, Manafort's accountants, KWC, started asking Gates if the Cyprus bank accounts were Manafort's. Gates told KWC that they needed to speak with Manafort. Gates was aware that these accounts were owned/controlled by Manafort and that Manafort was hiding them from his accountants.

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Gates eventually realized based on questions by KWC [redacted] that he needed to get his name off of Manafort's accounts because he was exposed. Gates subsequently had his name removed from the accounts and had nominees put in his place. Gates never discussed this with Manafort because Manafort already thought that Gates removed his name from the accounts, and that only nominee Cypriots were on the accounts. Manafort knew and understood that these were his nominees and that they were his accounts.

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b7CU.S. Vendors and Real Estate

Manafort directed Gates to execute wire transfers to pay Manafort's vendors from the Cypriot bank accounts. Manafort advised that he would take care of handling [redacted]

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Regarding Manafort's real estate purchases, Manafort dealt with his accountants at KWC, but over time Gates became aware that Manafort was using money from his Ukraine work to purchase real estate and fund his families expenses directly from the Cypriot accounts. Gates stated that Manafort used the funds from Cypriot accounts to hide the income from his accountants.

KWC

KWC were Manafort's accountants. Generally, KWC sent DMP ledgers to Gates and KWC created DMP tax liability projections based on ledgers. At the end of the year, KWC would file an extension with the IRS for DMP and work on completing DMP's ledgers. [redacted] prepared the ledgers with the finalized categories and then sent them to KWC for review. KWC would review the ledgers to make sure the entries were appropriately categorized.

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Gates was getting more questions from KWC about the ledgers when [redacted] [redacted] took over the account. Gates had a couple of conversations with

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Richard Gates , On 02/28/2018 , Page 7 of 7

Manafort about the fact that both KWC [redacted] were asking a lot more questions about the ledgers. There were times when Gates did not know the answers to KWC's questions, so he would ask Manafort and Manafort provided the answers. Every year there was a review session, usually via conference call, with Manafort, Gates, and KWC about DMP/Manafort's taxes

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During the years when DMP/Manafort were making a lot of money, DMP /Manafort's tax liability was high. Manafort did not want to pay this tax liability and would speak to [redacted]. Subsequently, the income was categorized as loans rather than income. Gates was not directly involved in these conversations between [redacted] and Manafort, but Manafort told [redacted] that the some of the money obtained from the Ukraine were the "loans". However, Manafort and Gates knew that the "loans" were actually income and it was fraudulently being categorized as loans to Manafort's accountants.

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
Sometime in 2014, Gates had a conversation with [redacted] where it became clear to Gates that they did not know that Manafort controlled the Cypriot bank accounts and entities. Gates stated that [redacted] had specifically questioned Manafort about the Cypriot bank accounts and entities, and Manafort stated that he was not the beneficial owner and Gates made the same representation. However, Gates stated that they both knew what they told [redacted] was not truthful.

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Regarding bonuses Gates received from Manafort's Cypriot accounts, Gates stated that Manafort asked Gates if he was "taking care of it", a reference to the taxes, and Gates interpreted that to mean Manafort was insuring that Gates was not claiming this as income because it was coming from Manafort's Cypriot accounts and could reveal Manafort's control over the accounts. Gates explained that he and Manafort did not need to have a specific conversation about this because they both knew what they were doing and understood that it was illegal.

Generally, Manafort would direct Gates to do something on his behalf and Gates would do it without question. For example, Manafort would task Gates to provide false information to the banks and Gates would follow his orders.

Generally, Manafort spent November through March at his home in Florida; March through May at his condominium in Virginia; and May through September at his home in the Hamptons.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/09/2018

Richard GATES, was interviewed at the 395 E Street SW, Washington, D. C. Also present in the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad, SASC Andrew Weissmann, ASAC William McCausland, and SSA [REDACTED] Gates was interview as part of the terms of his plea agreement. GATES provided the following information:

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GATES joined the Donald J. TRUMP Presidential Campaign in March 2016. The financial health of the campaign was not good at the time because TRUMP was self-funding the expenses. TRUMP made a pledge to his supporters on this point which he wanted to uphold. GATES did not think there were any fundraising opportunities at the time. The campaign had apathy towards not doing anything else and the RNC [Republican National Committee] support was not yet there. Eventually the TRUMP Campaign started to build a fundraising mechanism.

[Steven] MNUCHIN joined the campaign and became the finance chair around May of 2016. Other people on the campaign had a problem with the decision to bring MNUCHIN on because he had never raised a fundraising penny in his life. TRUMP realized the magnitude of self-funding a campaign - it could not be done. Paul MANAFORT did not have much of a role in the campaign in March or April. MANAFORT became more involved after TRUMP won the primary. MANAFORT and Jared [KUSHNER] spoke often about how much it work it would be to fundraise. After the primary they were able to lean on the RNC to assist with fundraising.

There were many fundraising events. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 2 of 8

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The campaign could never buy the advertising time they wanted because the financial expense was not in the ballpark of what they could afford to spend. The [James] COMEY email scenario helped - the last ten days before the election were good from a fundraising perspective. The money never really flowed. People contributed to big PACs due to the fact there were competitive House and Senate races. [REDACTED] contributed.

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MANAFORT and [REDACTED] knew each other for a long time. [REDACTED] was hired on to the campaign. The campaign wanted [REDACTED] to move to New York which was something he did not want to do. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 3 of 8

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 4 of 8

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 5 of 8

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 6 of 8

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 7 of 8

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 3/20/2018 . On 03/20/2018 . Page 8 of 8

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

On Thursday, July 5, 2018, Richard Gates appeared at the Office of the Special Counsel in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort (Manafort) in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres. The following information was furnished:

Since his last meeting with the Office of the Special Counsel on June 27, 2018, Gates has been in contact with [redacted]

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Gates was shown a photo that recently appeared in various news article (copy attached). Gates stated the photo was taken prior to his Ukraine tenure with Paul Manafort and Davis Manafort Partners. Gates identified the location of the photo as Davis Manafort's office in Kiev, Ukraine.

Gates was able to identify the following from the photo:

Standing - Left to Right: [redacted] UNSUB and [redacted]

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Sitting - Left to Right: Konstantine Kilimnik, UNSUB, possibly [redacted]
[redacted] UNSUB (new articles identified this individual as [redacted]
however, Gates said this was not [redacted] Paul Manafort and [redacted]

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Prior to his plea agreement with the Government, Gates stated Manafort told him that he was going to get help from SL (Sergei Lyovochkin) and his people.

Gates brought his laptop and while in the presence of Senior Financial Investigator [redacted]

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[redacted] Paralegal Specialists [redacted]
[redacted]

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
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
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Investigation on 07/05/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/11/2018

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/16/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 1/30/2018, SA [redacted] interviewed MARK LENZI, [redacted]

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[redacted]
via secure telephone. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, LENZI provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) LENZI [redacted]

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[redacted]
(U//~~FOUO~~) LENZI worked for International Republican Institute (IRI) from 2003 to 2007, assigned to Tbilisi, Georgia. In 2007, LENZI left IRI to [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) IRI and KILIMNIK

(U//~~FOUO~~) IRI routinely hosted conferences for its country teams. Through these conferences, LENZI got to know other individuals at IRI including KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK.

(U//~~FOUO~~) KILIMNIK ran the Moscow office of IRI from 2004 until 2005. LENZI worked with KILIMNIK to send Moscow youth groups to Tbilisi. Around this time, LENZI had been advised by IRI headquarters to be careful about what he disclosed to KILIMNIK about IRI activities in Georgia. KILIMNIK visited IRI's offices in Tbilisi one time.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~

~~Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20431231~~

~~SECRET~~

Investigation on 01/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/05/2018

by [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of MARK LENZI . On 01/30/2018 . Page 2 of 3b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) KILIMNIK was smart and very good at what he did. He spoke good English and knew the region very well. Additionally, he had great contacts.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [Due to indeterminate classification of the information provided, this paragraph is being marked SECRET pending further review.]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2005, IRI fired KILIMNIK. STEVEN NIX, the US-based Eurasian director for IRI, was both KILIMNIK's and LENZI's boss.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) LENZI provided an email from KILIMNIK's Davis-Manafort email address in April 2006 that had been forwarded to him by one of his subordinates at IRI (attached here as a 1A). The email describes

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(U//~~FOUO~~)

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(U//~~FOUO~~) SAM PATTEN

~~SECRET~~

FBI(19cv1278)-2989

~~SECRET~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of MARK LENZI . On 01/30/2018 . Page 3 of 3

(U//~~FOUO~~) WILLIAM SAMUEL "SAM" PATTEN was the head of IRI Moscow before KILIMNIK. PATTEN had worked for Senator Collins. PATTEN had lived for a long time in Russia and

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
(U//~~FOUO~~) LENZI had been a good friend of PATTEN's but had a falling out over what he described as PATTEN selling out.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2008, PATTEN had gone to work in Georgia where he worked initially for the Georgian government and subsequently for the opposition. LENZI described PATTEN's clients at this time as sketchy.

(U//~~FOUO~~) LENZI last saw PATTEN in Washington, DC in or around 20015

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FBI(19cv1278)-2990

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/18/2017

(U) On or about 5/16/2017 Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] interviewed [redacted] [redacted], DOB [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) Administrative

(U) The 05/16/2017 interview was established through a series of phone calls to [redacted] and [redacted] on 05/15/2017 and 05/16/2017. On 05/17/2017 SA [redacted] contacted [redacted] and conducted a brief telephonic clarifying interview which is included at the end of this FD-302.

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National~~
~~Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~b3
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Investigation on 05/16/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person, Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2017

by [redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(DOB [Redacted])

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 05/16/2017, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted]
[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of (DOB [redacted]) , On 05/16/2017 , Page 3 of 3

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
(U) 05/17/2017 Telephone Call

(U) SA [redacted] called [redacted] at [redacted] to clarify his email address and to ask clarifying questions.

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On August 16, 2017, [REDACTED], work address [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], work telephone number [REDACTED]
was interviewed at his place of work, [REDACTED]. After being
advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/18/2017

by [REDACTED]

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b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 11, 2017, [REDACTED], telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically. Also present during the interview was [REDACTED] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On occasion, [REDACTED] would also deal with Gates.

Initially [REDACTED] said he didn't have knowledge of Manafort having any foreign bank account(s); however, he recalled later during the interview Manafort receiving incoming wire transfers from accounts in Cyprus.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/15/2017

by [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 05/11/2017 . Page 2 of 2

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[Redacted] last spoke with Manafort in approximately 2013 or 2014 [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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FBI(19cv1278)-2996



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On June 27, 2017, [redacted] social security
number [redacted] date of birth [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]
was interviewed at her residence. After being advised of the identities of
the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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The [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 06/27/2017 at [redacted] Maryland, United States (In Person)

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File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/27/2017

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by [redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 06/27/2017 . Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 06/27/2017 . Page 3 of 3b3
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[REDACTED] was advised lying to an FBI agent is a federal crime,
and [REDACTED] understood, but assured agents what she had told them was
the truth.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3007



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/12/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On April 18, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]
[redacted] Virginia, work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed
at her place of employment, [redacted]. Also present during the
interview was financial investigator [redacted]. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Home address: [redacted]

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Personal telephone numbers: [redacted]

Email addresses: [redacted]

DL: [redacted]

Investigation on 04/18/2017 at [redacted] Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/05/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

(U) Interview of

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
04/18
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2 of 2

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 11, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Also present during the interview was [REDACTED] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

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File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/19/2017

by [REDACTED]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 05/11/2017 . Page 2 of 2

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On September 20, 2017, [redacted]
work address [redacted] work
telephone number [redacted] were interviewed at their place of
employment, [redacted] by SA [redacted]
and Senior Financial Investigator [redacted] After being advised
of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]
[redacted] knew who Paul Manafort (Manafort) was, but
neither one ever had contact with Manafort. [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] was served with a Federal Grand Jury subpoena, [redacted]
[redacted] advised the subpoena


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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 09/20/2017 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/21/2017

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On September 20, 2017, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Virginia, cellular telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed
in the lobby of the Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel located at 1000 H Street
NW, Washington DC by SA [REDACTED] and Senior Financial Investigator
[REDACTED]. Also present during the interview was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from the law firm of Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel and
Patrick. [REDACTED] work address is 1615 M Street NW, Suite 400,
Washington DC, and his work telephone number is [REDACTED]. After being
advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] believed the total for the work he did for Paul Manafort
(Manafort) was approximately \$125,000. [REDACTED] did not have discussions
with Manafort about any of his overseas accounts. [REDACTED] recalled an
email he saw from Manafort to [REDACTED] controller, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], in which Manafort told [REDACTED] to expect a wire from an
overseas company. [REDACTED] could not recall the name of the
company. [REDACTED] did not have any issues with his bank regarding any of
Manafort's wires to [REDACTED].

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Manafort was one of [REDACTED] only clients who paid with a wire. Most of
[REDACTED] clients pay with a check.

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[REDACTED] never had contact with Rick Gates (Gates) or Nigro, Karlin, Segal,
and Feldstein (NKSFB).

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did not know how
Manafort got [REDACTED] name to do this work. [REDACTED] assumed it was through
a referral from another of [REDACTED] clients. [REDACTED] does work for many
high profile individuals in the Washington DC area.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 09/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In
Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/20/2017

by [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/20/2017 . Page 2 of 2b6
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Manafort never told [REDACTED] what Manafort did for a living, only that Manafort travels internationally.

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
Manafort never invested money in [REDACTED] company.

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Although [REDACTED] brought documentation to give to the writer, [REDACTED] advised he wanted to make copies of the documents before giving them to the writer, and would contact the writer when the documents were ready.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3025



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/25/2018

On Tuesday, November 28th, 2017 [redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW. by Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew A. Weissmann, SASC Zainab Ahmad, Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Forensic Accountant [redacted] SASC Jeannie Rhee was also present during a portion of the interview. [redacted] was represented by [redacted] and [redacted] a paralegal from [redacted] [redacted] was also present. After being advised the identities of the interviewing parties SASC Weissmann explained to [redacted] that the interview was voluntary and if at any time he wanted to consult with his counsel he could do so. [redacted] was advised that he needed to be honest in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [redacted] acknowledged that he understood and then provided the following information:

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Introduction to Trump

[redacted] met Donald J. Trump at a conference he attended [redacted] Through organizations associated with [redacted] [redacted] received calls suggesting [redacted] attend a conference which Trump, in his role as a business man and developer, was to be a speaker. [redacted] recalled the conference having been held in [redacted] At the conference, awaiting Trump's arrival with a small group of attendees, [redacted] decided on his own initiative to move outside the hotel and personally meet Trump as he arrived. While walking back in to the conference space, [redacted] presented his sales pitch and offered his help in the event Trump decided to run for President in the future. Corey Lewandowski was accompanying Trump at this event. [redacted] provided his contact information to Lewandowski and the two remained in touch.

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After Trump announced his candidacy for President, he or Lewandowski contacted [redacted] regarding a rally [redacted] assisted in making some logistical arrangements for the rally and interacted with Trump during and around the event. This interaction included a meeting on Trump's airplane in which it was discussed [redacted]

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Investigation on 11/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/29/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 2 of 12

[REDACTED] stated he described to Trump that [REDACTED] but remained in touch - including some in person contact - after this meeting.

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Beginning in [REDACTED] started appearing on television as a campaign surrogate. [REDACTED] stated this representation was directed and offered by Trump and/or Lewandowski.

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Appointment in formal campaign role

Around June 20, 2016, when Lewandowski was fired from his role in the Trump campaign, Jared Kushner called [REDACTED]. The two discussed [REDACTED] taking on a larger role in the campaign, with Kushner asking [REDACTED] when he could come to New York to meet in person. Later that same week, [REDACTED] traveled to New York and met Kushner at his offices at 666 5th Avenue where Kushner asked [REDACTED] what he would like to do for the campaign. [REDACTED] stated that he, in his prior interactions with the campaign, had assessed the operational aspects to have been a mess, chaotic, and in need of process. At the time of these observations, he hadn't wanted to overstep his informal role, but since Kushner had called and invited him to New York, he pitched a potential [REDACTED] type role. [REDACTED] assessment was that Kushner was the defacto campaign manager and appeared to make hiring/firing decisions. [REDACTED] came to this conclusion after Lewandowski was fired, but thought that Lewandowski may not have had full authority as campaign manager.

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After this discussion at Kushner's offices, Kushner and [REDACTED] walked to a small conference room in Trump Tower for a meeting. In the room were [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] described him as [REDACTED] and Rick Gates. [REDACTED]

During this portion of the meeting [REDACTED] stated he acted as an observer, but the reason for his presence became clear at the end. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 3 of 12

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Kushner stated that [REDACTED] would be [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] of the campaign [REDACTED] asked whether he
would have a role in [REDACTED] and Kushner stated [REDACTED] would be [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] After this meeting, [REDACTED]
started working.

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[REDACTED] does not recall when Gates left the meeting, but recalled him being
there for the bulk of it. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was focused on his new role and
responsibility.

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Activities during the campaign

[REDACTED] stated that his [REDACTED] role was not defined. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] campaign staffers started coming to him to make
decisions. [REDACTED] stated he was unsure if they were coming because of his
official role or because he was [REDACTED] At the
time of his work with the campaign, [REDACTED] was still serving as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and also working on his [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated he typically spent
approximately 11 out of 14 days physically with the campaign at Trump
Tower and then traveling home for a long weekend [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED] which was
accomplished via email. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked with

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 4 of 12

[REDACTED] viewed himself as the filter between the campaign and [REDACTED] used a common sense approach with [REDACTED] He was not provided with parameters or a budget.

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[REDACTED] stated he reported to Kushner. [REDACTED] detailed a few individuals he believed reported to him. [REDACTED] (phonetic) was described as a [REDACTED] relied on her because her tenure with the campaign predated his arrival and she possessed institutional knowledge. She was one of his most direct reports. [REDACTED] handled [REDACTED] responsibilities and had reporting responsibility to [REDACTED] Later, [REDACTED] brought [REDACTED] in to support him; [REDACTED] had worked with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] viewed his role as being [REDACTED] while the other side was political and managed by Manafort and Gates. [REDACTED] described there typically being more interest from the staff in the political side. [REDACTED] Manafort, Gates, and their team. He described this team as consisting of [REDACTED] two younger guys [REDACTED] did not recall their names [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] described Manafort and Gates to have a significant role associated with managing delegates. There was fear within the campaign of the rules committee and the actions they could take to affect change in the nomination process. Manafort and Gates presented themselves as being knowledgeable about the process.

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[REDACTED] stated that staff would be brought on to the campaign - and be paid - without him being made aware. [REDACTED] raised this issue with Kushner after he tried to resolve the issue at his level. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated in August 2016, he was on a plane with Trump when they heard on the television that Manafort had resigned. [REDACTED] stated Trump was upset at this characterization because Trump felt he had fired Manafort. [REDACTED] asked Trump why he fired Manafort and not Gates as well. Trump replied yes to removing Gates as well and asked [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 5 of 12

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] felt that Trump made it clear that Gates was to be fired. [REDACTED] advised that Gates was also fired.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When [REDACTED] attempted to fire employees he ran into opposition from Bannon and Conway who stated he had to run those decisions through them. [REDACTED] consulted with Kushner who confirmed what Bannon/Conway had stated. [REDACTED] does not recall [REDACTED] and stated that Bannon wanted to keep Gates. Bannon did not provide reasons but stated it was Bannon's decision to make.

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[REDACTED] stated that Gates possible involvement with Ukraine and the black ledger was part of his argument that Gates had significant issues and [REDACTED] raised those issues with Kushner. [REDACTED] was also aware of other allegations regarding Gates. Specifically, an allegation that he had

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[REDACTED]

recalled involving [REDACTED] from HR and discussing whether it was a larger issue. [REDACTED] stated he also discussed the matter with Kushner but by the time he had that conversation with Kushner, [REDACTED] was under the impression Gates was gone from the campaign. [REDACTED] learned Gates moved to the Republican National Committee (RNC) and then later the RNC stationed back with the campaign.

Campaign finances

[REDACTED]

encountered a competing budget version maintained by Steve Mnuchin. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Mnuchin's projections would tie specific inflows to specific expenditures and worked with Brad Parscale. [REDACTED] Parscale, Kushner, and Mnuchin were typically involved in budget discussions although others (NFI) participated as well.

Mnuchin and [REDACTED] were responsible for fundraising, with [REDACTED] and others - including [REDACTED] LNU - handling calls to big money donors. If someone served as a bundler, the RNC assigned them a bundler number.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 6 of 12

Discussions of contributions from Trump started at the management level without Trump's involvement. Mnuchin would often take the outcome of those discussions and have direct interactions with Trump. Parscale was responsible for project digital fund raising. Parscale drove a lot of the campaign expenditures - and would detail the amount he needed for Giles-Parscale's (G-P) efforts. G-P would submit daily invoices and were paid daily. The daily invoices included details of payments to or invoices from sub-contractors, but [REDACTED] stated the purpose of the sub-contractor was not always apparent. [REDACTED] described a desire to audit the G-P invoices, but stated it was not done as the campaign did not have the manpower or bandwidth to undertake the effort. Parscale reported to Kushner who approved his requirements. [REDACTED] was not involved in that approval.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of money coming to the campaign from foreign sources and stated that everyone knows you cannot accept such funds. He did recall a screw up where a fundraising email blast, organized by Parscale, went to at least one overseas official, possibly located in the United Kingdom. Parscale had been buying email lists - through an organization called Conservative Connections - and [REDACTED] believed the foreign address came from them. [REDACTED] did not recall the specific timing of this issue or how he learned about it but believed it could have been in July or August. He did not recall how Parscale resolved the issue but knew Parscale handled the response.

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[REDACTED] did not recall any foreign contributions being made to the campaign. However, he stated if an attempt to send foreign funds to the campaign had occurred it would have been handled by [REDACTED] initially as he actually handled the money - including cash and other physical deposits. Red Curve provided daily cash reports to the campaign. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated contributions came to an account controlled by Red Curve and that the campaign relied on Red Curve for maintaining compliance with Federal Election Commission (FEC) requirements, including filings. [REDACTED] stated he believed [REDACTED] and lawyers from Jones Day would have dealt with any FEC issues, although he expected [REDACTED] would have acted on his own regarding something as clear cut as dealing with a foreign contribution. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] and Jones Day lawyers communicated without his oversight and that [REDACTED] had access to everyone because he was a primary source of finance information.

Candidate financial contributions

[REDACTED] was aware that Trump's loans to the campaign were converted to contributions but does not recall being part of the discussion. He believes that the decision was made because of the potential negative

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 7 of 12

[REDACTED] optics with it being a loan to Trump. [REDACTED] stated that the campaign could have had trouble raising funds if the possibility existed they would be used to pay back Trump's loans. [REDACTED] was shown the forgiveness letter filed with the FEC. He again stated he did not recall being involved in the decision process and may have heard about the conversion from either [REDACTED] or Don McGahn. [REDACTED] speculated that a decision this big - given the amount of money involved - would have been made with all Trump's children and not just Kushner. There were standing meetings on Monday mornings with Trump and his children. [REDACTED] also thought, based on the timing of the conversion, that Manafort had possibly been involved in the process.

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[REDACTED] recalled always feeling that the campaign was broke and that every time money would come in there would be multiple people competing for the same dollar. [REDACTED] stated the end of the campaign was especially a time of financial pressure. His personal opinion was that Mnuchin and Parscale's projections - for traditional and online donors respectively - had been lofty, the campaign had spent based on their projections, and ultimately the money did not come in at the expected level.

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[REDACTED] was asked about his awareness of Trump's multiple contributions of \$2,000,000 and single \$10,000,000 contribution after the loan conversion decision. He recalled Mnuchin and Kushner would have been involved in discussing those decisions and possibly Parscale and Bannon as well - especially with the later contributions. With regards specifically to the \$10,000,000 contribution, he recalled a shared belief held by himself, Mnuchin, Kushner and Parscale that if Trump wanted to win, the campaign needed \$10,000,000 to come from the candidate. The urgency was driven by the thought that some swing states were polling within the margin of error and a last minute push might make the difference. [REDACTED] believed the funds would have been used for ad buys but he did not specifically recall how the expenditures were split. He assumed a majority went to G-P for digital ad buys and possibly Jamestown Associates for traditional media.

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Reaction to DNC Hack

[REDACTED] was asked about the response within the campaign to the news of the Democratic National Committee hack. He recalled the primary response of the campaign was to evaluate their own systems for ways to make them more secure. He also recalled unspecified speculation that if collusion with Russians had occurred, it most likely would have been done by the Clinton campaign. [REDACTED] identified the *Clinton Cash* book and information regarding the Uranium One deal playing into these discussions.

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After relaying the above information, there was a break in the interview. When it resumed, SASC Andrew A. Weissmann and Supervisory Special Agent

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 8 of 12

[REDACTED] continued the interview of [REDACTED] in the presence of his counsel. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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There was no formal campaign's email policy but the preference was that employees use their [REDACTED] email address. The main goal was to get the information out to people on the campaign and there was no emphasis on process.

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[REDACTED] was shown an email chain dated 08/02/2016 related to payment invoices with the following individuals on the email chain: [REDACTED] Rick Gates, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] wanted to get [REDACTED] paid for his services to the campaign. [REDACTED] was directed to an email dated 07/25/2016 which stated "Here's a sensitive one that you and I need to discuss." [REDACTED] stated that "sensitive" in the email was a reference to [REDACTED] wanting the invoice to get paid. [REDACTED] had received previous invoice he had questioned because there were no contracts signed for the services and the agreements were verbal. When [REDACTED] was presented with an invoice related to a verbal agreements which [REDACTED] was not aware of he would often contact Corey Lewandowski, and ask if there was a verbal agreement and what the terms of the agreement where. Lewandowski would often advise that the invoice was overinflated.

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[REDACTED] stated that Donald Trump told him [REDACTED] when they were at [REDACTED] Lewandowski and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told Trump about the issues related to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know the specifics. [REDACTED] was unpopular with people at the campaign because of something he did and he was not viewed as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know the specifics. [REDACTED] did not recall what [REDACTED] role was on the campaign.

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[REDACTED] consulted with Corey Lewandowski to determine who at the campaign were "good people and who were bad people." Lewandowski advised that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Kushner was also responsible for getting Lewandowski removed from the campaign; thus, enabling Kushner to have a greater role over the campaign.

[REDACTED] stated that Manafort was not a hard worker. Often Manafort showed up at campaign headquarters at 10:00 a.m. and left at 1:00 p.m., never to be seen again for the rest of the day. Manafort had a "mob boss" attitude.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 9 of 12

[REDACTED] stated he heard that "the kids", referring to Donald Trump's kids, brought Manafort on to the campaign. Kushner was Manafort's biggest advocate but [REDACTED] did not know why. [REDACTED] advised that he did not have a relationship with Trump's kids.

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[REDACTED] stated that Kushner always protected Gates but he did not know why and did not understand why. [REDACTED] stated that Parscale was one of Gate's biggest supporters. After Manafort was fired from the campaign, Parscale would bring Gates into the campaign office and Gates would sit next to Parscale. Parscale often would have high level conversations while Gates was close to him and shortly thereafter the information would leak to the press.

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[REDACTED] was shown an email chain dated 09/30/2016 with the subject "Outstanding Payments." [REDACTED] stated that he felt the email implied to Steve Bannon that [REDACTED] was not doing his job. [REDACTED] used the term "not legit" in the email to represent that Gate's assertions were not accurate regarding Mike Caputo's claim because Lewandowski told [REDACTED] that Caputo was a volunteer on the campaign and should not be paid. [REDACTED] stated he had a telephone conversation with Bannon the same day the email was sent but he could not recall the specifics of the conversation. [REDACTED] forwarded the email to [REDACTED] to check to see whether the payments enumerated in numbers 1 and 3 in the email were paid.

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Manafort and Gates were brought on to the campaign as volunteers. [REDACTED] stated the campaign required employees to sign an NDA; either a volunteer NDA or a paid employee NDA. Manafort and Gates signed the volunteer NDA. [REDACTED] does not recall Manafort being paid for his expenses. [REDACTED] had never heard of Manafort getting paid one million dollars by the campaign and if [REDACTED] would have seen or heard about such a request he would have objected. Conversely, Gates was paid for expenses and [REDACTED] thought that his expenses were inflated. Gates originally requested a certain amount for his expenses and when the campaign agreed to pay those expenses, Gates increased the expenses to approximately [REDACTED] refused to pay Gates' expenses and told Don McGahn that if he wanted Gates to be paid then he should do it himself.

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[REDACTED] suspected that Manafort and Gates profited monetarily in different ways than being paid directly by the campaign for their services. [REDACTED] stated that after Trump secured the nomination, Manafort and Gates pitched an idea to pay a firm 5 to 10 million dollars for add buys. [REDACTED] stated this made no sense because Trump already secured the nomination. [REDACTED] could not recall the name of the firm but the person who ran the firm was a friend of Manafort. [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] and made sure the deal was not executed. [REDACTED] viewed Manafort and Gates as [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 10 of 12

[REDACTED] was shown an email chain dated 11/05/2016 between himself and Hope Hicks. Hicks was part of the "original five" who were with the campaign from the beginning. [REDACTED] stated he and Hicks had a good relationship and they both did not like Gates. [REDACTED] did not know if Hicks would know how or why Gates was not fired from the campaign. Hicks knew that [REDACTED] was constantly trying to get Gates removed from the campaign and she tried to help him by forwarding [REDACTED] negative articles about Manafort and Gates to give him ammunition to show that they were involved in questionable acts. [REDACTED] stated that he created the term [REDACTED] to describe Gates. [REDACTED] made it known to many people at the campaign that Gates needed to be removed. [REDACTED] stated that you would not want Gates to participate in a local council election let alone a presidential election based on his questionable past.

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[REDACTED] was shown chain dated 08/31/2016 which referenced a New York Post article regarding Gates' association with a company named Eyelock. [REDACTED] stated he had never heard of Eyelock prior to receiving the email. Hicks sent this article to [REDACTED] so he would have more ammunition to try to get Gates removed from the campaign. [REDACTED] discussed this negative article Kushner and Parscale in an effort to get Gates removed. Kushner told [REDACTED] not to worry about it and that Gates was a good guy. [REDACTED] continued to advocate to Kushner that Gates needed to be removed. Eventually, [REDACTED] was put in his place by Kushner and was told that Gates was staying and that [REDACTED] needed to deal with it.

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[REDACTED] also complained to Kushner about Manafort and told him about questionable people Manafort represented in the past such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as well as allegations that Manafort received two suitcases full of cash to provide to the Regan campaign which never reached the campaign. [REDACTED] told Kushner that if you simply google Manafort or Gates there were lots of articles which revealed that they were involved in a lot of questionable activity. However, Kushner did not seem to care and ignored [REDACTED]

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In light of Gates' questionable history with money, [REDACTED] was shocked when he was appointed to be the person in charge of the money for the inauguration committee. [REDACTED] stated Kushner made this decision with significant support from Parscale.

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[REDACTED] was shown an email dated 08/31/2016 which included a service agreement contract with Cambridge Analytica. [REDACTED] stated that he reviewed a draft of this service agreement and made changes to it because he did not like some of the language in the agreement. Cambridge was hired by Bannon. [REDACTED] stated the people who owned Breitbart also owned Cambridge and that is how Bannon was familiar with Cambridge. Cambridge was hired by

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 11 of 12

the campaign to work on targeted ads using a data modeling and a data targeting methodology. [REDACTED] was referred to Appendix D which stated that they had a service agreement with Cambridge since 06/13/2016. [REDACTED] stated he was not familiar with this but Lewandowski would know about it.

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[REDACTED] was not familiar with any foreign sources of campaign contributions to include any from Asian countries. [REDACTED] stated there was one incident with Parscale where he sent out campaign contribution solicitations utilizing a list that had foreign individuals. [REDACTED] stated Parscale was confronted about this and told that it was not legal to solicit foreign contributions. [REDACTED] stated that he thought Parscale was aware of this law because he never stated he was not aware of this requirement when confronted. [REDACTED] was not aware of any actual foreign money being contributed as a result of this.

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Prior to the public being told that Manafort was leaving the campaign, [REDACTED] was aware that Trump fired him. [REDACTED] heard that there was a meeting at Trump Tower attended by Manafort, Trump's kids, and Trump where Manafort was told there was too much bad press about him and as a result they could not keep him around. [REDACTED] heard that Manafort told them the stories were not accurate. [REDACTED] was on the Trump campaign plane with Trump, Hicks, [REDACTED] (phonetic), and Steve Miller when the news of Manafort's resignation was televised on the plane. Trump was very upset and stated Manafort did not resign and that he fired him. Trump spoke to Kellyanne Conway via telephone on the plane and asked her why the media was reporting that Manafort resigned when he fired him. Conway stated that she made the decision to tell the media that he resigned. Trump was not happy about this decision. Subsequently, [REDACTED] told Trump that since he fired Manafort he also needed to fire Gates because they were a package deal. Trump said yes fire Gates as well. [REDACTED]

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The Monday after the election, Sam Dearborn called [REDACTED] into his office and was told his services were no longer needed. [REDACTED] did not have any role in the inauguration or the transition. [REDACTED] thinks Dearborn was brought into the campaign by Manafort. [REDACTED] stated he believed Dearborn did not like him because [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/28/2017, Page 12 of 12

[REDACTED] was not aware of Manafort playing a role in the campaign or being consulted by people on the campaign or administration after he was fired.

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[REDACTED] did not become aware of the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower with Natalia Veselnitskaya, Manafort, Kushner, and Donald Trump Jr. until it was reported in the news this summer.


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The last time [REDACTED] recalled seeing Gates was on 06/17/2017 at the White House. Gates was with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] thinks he has heard the name [REDACTED] but he cannot recall why.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number ending in [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was A/ASAC [redacted] and attorney for Richard Gates, [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] met Richard Gates in the 1980's during the Ronald Reagan Presidential Campaign. At the time, [redacted] produced fundraising events for Reagan which included artists such as Wayne Newton, Dean Martin and Frank Sinatra. Gates and [redacted] both worked on the campaign and through that work, they had contact with [redacted] multiple times. After the campaign, [redacted] kept in touch with Gates and [redacted]

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Since the 1980's, Gates and [redacted] have "crossed paths" numerous times. The most recent contact was approximately 10 days ago and was prompted by the process of [redacted]

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Prior to 10 days ago [redacted] contacted Gates to find out [redacted] location. Burkhardt knew Gates and [redacted] worked together.

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[redacted] estimated he had contact with Gates and [redacted] around 5-10 times per year. Gates has invited [redacted] to produce events at times and they have some professional and social overlap. For example, [redacted] was involved in the Trump Presidential Campaign as was Gates. The last project [redacted] and Gates did together was approximately one year before the campaign began.

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Gates and [redacted] are not close friends. The majority of [redacted] and Gates' contact has been related to a specific event.

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[redacted] is like a brother to [redacted] and [redacted] have been close friends for decades and have made films together over the years.

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[redacted] has never been arrested. [redacted]

[redacted] is a [redacted]

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Investigation on 11/16/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017

by [redacted]

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 11/16/2017 , Page 2 of 2

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was
willing to be for Gates because Gates is "a good man."



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/17/2018

On May 10th 2018 3:00 PM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Perkins Coie Associate [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Staff Operations Specialist Analyst [REDACTED] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] stated the following:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] team consisted of 6 email staffers, one software developer, and one person dedicated to social media management. There were two advertising folks, with lots of overlap in responsibilities. The Digital Team was digital, but not an IT team. They had access to the digital team's shared drive but no elevated access outside of that drive. [REDACTED] believed this drive was housed on DCCC's main server. Within the shared drive were different folders for each department, [REDACTED] used the digital department's share drive to retrieve Photoshop files for placing onto digital content. She would store

Investigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/10/2018

by [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 4

[REDACTED]

files in the drive on occasion, but not regularly. Within the DCCC, the network infrastructure was mostly hosted on Microsoft Windows. All team members were given Dell laptops to perform work on.

The Digital Department ran the website and [REDACTED] was one of several who had access to the Wordpress sites. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The team saved passwords to shared documents. [REDACTED] had no reason to believe that the accounts listed on those shared documents had been victimized. [REDACTED] used a Google Drive shared to her personal account, the shared password document was not in this Google Drive.

During the Summer of 2016, [REDACTED] mostly worked from the DCCC office in DC. When she worked from home using her WiFi, she could get to the social media and websites without going through the VPN. The software developers would VPN into the network, but most of the team had no need to do this.

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During 2016 [REDACTED] work email address was [REDACTED] and her personal email was [REDACTED]. She did not recall if she shared her password with anyone at the time or how often she changed her passwords, but [REDACTED] recalled that she never shared personal passwords with people at work. [REDACTED] did use the same password in multiple accounts and she believed it was likely that she did have the same password in two places at once.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DCCC account username was [REDACTED]. She used this to VPN into the DCCC a few times, she recalled following the "how-to" document on connecting that referenced an IP address to connect. [REDACTED] had access to the Democratic National Committee's (DNC) Vertica database server through software written by [REDACTED] but did not have a personal account that would be able to connect. She leveraged this software to query the Vertica server.

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[REDACTED] DCCC's donation processing website, which was hosted by ActBlue.com. ActBlue.com was a place where Democratic campaigns and non-profits could process contribution payments. Groups could create fundraising projects and process the gifts. The site did not store credit card information, but did store encrypted details related to the credit card. ActBlue.com was not a DCCC entity, but all DCCC small dollar gifts were processed using this website for the 2016 campaign

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2018, Page 3 of 4

cycle. There were different fundraising pages created for high dollar gifts, used because of lower fees for customers. The DCCC used ActBlue.com to collect all small gift amounts and direct mail contributions. [REDACTED] explained that direct mailers and emails would include a shortened URL to a specific page hosted on ActBlue.com. Visits to these links would be tracked using IBM Marketing Cloud. Almost all click traffic at the time came from email embedded links. The management portal of ActBlue.com was hosted on WordPress Engine, which is where the developer would interface.

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[REDACTED] learned of the news that the DCCC's Wordpress website had been hacked in June 2016 when the CEO and COO of DCCC learned from CrowdStrike. She recalled that CrowdStrike was on site that day, on or around June 21st 2016. The hack included a change to links on the DCCC page that would redirect visitors to the DCCC's ActBlue payment processing page for donation processing. There were two places that this link was changed, the top and bottom navigational panels. The link was changed from ActBlue.com to ActBlues.com. The redirect to the malicious ActBlues.com domain would then redirect users back to the legitimate ActBlue.com website. The redirect occurred very quickly in a secure manner, and users would still be able to make payments. In the WordPress Engine site for DCCC's ActBlue's portal, [REDACTED] confirmed that the URLs with lower volume had been redirected to ActBlues.

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[REDACTED] corrected the malicious redirect in late June, but shortly after found that the links were once again changed to ActBlues. [REDACTED] stated that the credentials for the Wordpress engine were shared on a spreadsheet between several others, so it was impossible to see who had made changes.

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During the June 2016 timeframe, someone on the team had looked into the analytics to determine how much traffic was redirected, but were not able to come up with a number. Also, [REDACTED] did not recall if they were able to determine the day the links were changed. [REDACTED] did not recall how many donations DCCC received through the ActBlue.com portal during the Spring and Summer of 2016, but believed it to be in the hundreds, with a daily total being only around ten. [REDACTED] did not notice anything unusual in the IBM Analytics account that would have made her suspect an account compromise. [REDACTED] did not recall any donor complaints subsequent to the issue.

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[Agent Note: [REDACTED] was shown a series of printed emails]

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[REDACTED] recognized the first email, dated August 2nd 2016, as she pulled it from her inbox at the request of counsel. She did not recall receiving or opening the email, but did notice that it had been opened when she retrieved it for counsel. She also noticed that she had forwarded the email to the COO of DCCC, who in turn sent it to CrowdStrike. [REDACTED] also

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2018, Page 4 of 4

[REDACTED] recognized the second email, dated April 6th 2016, and also noticed that it had been opened. However, this email was not forwarded to the COO of DCCC. [REDACTED] also recognized the third email dated August 6th 2016, and stated that when she retrieved it that she noticed it had not been opened. [REDACTED] found these spear phishing emails convincing, and noted that they appeared legit. [REDACTED] stated that she was willing to pull additional metadata regarding the spears if needed.

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[REDACTED] had no memory of changing her passwords during this time frame, or allowing others to use her personal accounts. She never authorized others to use her credentials.

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During 2016, [REDACTED] did not recall seeing any warning messages or banners on her Google account warning her of malicious activity. She also did not notice any denial of service, such as not being able to log onto one of her accounts. [REDACTED] was unfamiliar with archival compressing tools such as WinZip, WinRAR, and 7zip. [REDACTED] recognized the name of [REDACTED] but did not use his computer. [REDACTED] only used Microsoft Windows computers, but believed that [REDACTED] may have used a Unix computer.

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
During April and May of 2016, [REDACTED] recalled her average working day being from [REDACTED] during the work week. On the weekends, she would log on sporadically from home.

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[REDACTED] originally learned of the DCCC compromise through an all staff meeting. [REDACTED] was concerned with the possible compromise of her personal emails and the potential of the emails being released publicly. She described the threat of releasing personal emails as terrifying because she used it for all aspects of her life. The hack of the DCCC's computer network and DCCC website caused [REDACTED] no huge personal expense. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled that many people at the DCCC had their personal income taxes filed falsely in their name in 2017. The DCCC invested in credit monitoring for employees. [REDACTED] stated that she received no alerts for suspicious credit activity.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/14/2018

On or around 6/12/2018, SA [] and Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, Greg Andres, and Brian Richardson spoke to attorneys for [] After being advised of the people on the call, [] counsel proffered the following information:

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At the time of MANAFORT's call to [] on 2/24/2018, [] was in the car [] was driving. [] was confident that MANAFORT had called him on his [] usually saw the caller's number when he received calls [] but MANAFORT's number did not display on [] phone. [] did not use speakerphone for this telephone call.

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[] had developed an intuitive sense of what 30, 60, and 90 seconds feel like. [] was confident that the call lasted approximately 30 seconds.

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MANAFORT said, "This is Paul - Paul Manafort. I need to give you a heads-up."

[] responded, "Hello Paul."

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MANAFORT said, "I need to give you a heads up about Hapsburg." At this point, [] turned down the radio so he could hear the call more clearly. MANAFORT continued, "Have you seen any articles about Hapsburg? It's important that we talk. I have an update about Hapsburg."

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[] responded, "I can't talk right now."

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MANAFORT continued, "I need to give you a heads up about Hapsburg..."

At this point, [] hung up the phone while MANAFORT was still talking. [] wanted to get off the phone quickly.


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Investigation on 06/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [] Date drafted 06/14/2018

by []

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] Banc of California, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]
[redacted] he has been employed in the banking industry, on the mortgage lending side. [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] is the underwriting group which consists of Portfolio Managers and Credit Analysts.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] Relationship Managers are generally the individuals in direct communication with borrowers and they work with the Portfolio Managers to service the client's lending needs.

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Investigation on 12/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/18/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 2 of 7

Loan Process

When a potential loan comes to a Relationship Manager, it is referred to the Portfolio Management Group. [redacted] assigns the loan to a Portfolio Manager and Credit Analyst for underwriting. A needs list is sent to the borrower via the Relationship Manager and relevant documentation such as: personal financial statement (PFS), loan application (1003), schedule of real estate owned (REO), tax returns and other income documentation is obtained.

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A cash flow analysis is conducted by the underwriting team. If the borrower is a commercial entity or the collateral is an income generating property, the cash flow analysis is different than if the borrower is an individual or non-income generating entity. The underwriting team looks for the global cash flow of the borrower and the source of repayment of the loan. In order to determine global cash flow, underwriters look at tax returns, income statements, PFS and other income documents.

If the loan meets BOC's guidelines, the underwriters will prepare a Credit Approval Memorandum (CAM), which is an internal document describing the borrower, the loan terms, the financial analysis of the borrower and the sources of repayment. The CAM is reviewed by the underwriting team lead and then [redacted]. If approved, it is sent to [redacted] for approval.

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[redacted]
[redacted] Loans exceeding \$5 million must be approved by the Chief Credit Officer.

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b7CDebt Service Coverage

Debt Service Coverage (DSC) is a ratio calculated to assess whether the borrower can afford to repay the loan as well as all of their other debt obligations. DSC is an important factor because BOC does not want to rely on converting assets, liquidating brokerage accounts or selling property, as a source of repayment. BOC requires unsecured loans to have a DSC of at least 1.25X the loan amount. The debt for the unsecured loan is included in the global debt calculation and is amortized with principle and interest over a five year period.

When determining cash flow, underwriters review tax returns, PFS, interim financial statements such as profit loss statements (P&Ls), W2s, K-1s, REO schedule, investment income portfolios and bank account statements. BOC does not require P&Ls to be audited by CPAs, but requires the information in the P&Ls to be accurate.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 3 of 7

When determining debt, underwriters review the PFS, credit report and REO schedule. All debt obligations including mortgages, car loans, commercial lines of credit and any other loan are required to be reported on the PFS. Underwriters have visibility into much of the borrower's debt through their credit report, but not all loans are reported to the credit bureaus and therefore BOC relies on the borrower to provide an accurate and complete picture of their global debt obligations.

The PFS is signed by the borrower to attest to the accuracy of the the information contained therein.

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Paul Manafort and [REDACTED] applied for a business line of credit from BOC for their entity, [REDACTED] was created for their [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not have any historical income for underwriting to rely upon. As a result, [REDACTED] business plan and projected cash flow were reviewed as part of the underwriting for the loan. In addition, Manafort and [REDACTED] were required to personally guarantee the loan and therefore cash flow analysis was calculated for them as individuals. Guarantor income was an important factor for this loan as it was unsecured and the business entity did not have any historical cash flow to rely upon.

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[REDACTED] did not know how Manafort and/or [REDACTED] were referred to BOC. [REDACTED] could not recall when he first learned of the [REDACTED] loan. [REDACTED] would have been approached by [REDACTED] or someone from the underwriting team with an overview of the loan in the early stages. [REDACTED] recalled that a number of wealthy individuals were associated with [REDACTED] but he could not recall specifics.

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[REDACTED] was the primary source of repayment for the BOC loan. [REDACTED] did not personally review the business plan supplied by Manafort and [REDACTED] but he recalled such a business plan was reviewed and factored into the underwriting process. Manafort and [REDACTED] indicated the proceeds of the BOC loan would be used for up front costs [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] believed the Portfolio Manager for the [REDACTED] loan was [REDACTED] and the Credit Analyst was [REDACTED] would

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 4 of 7

have been the person to review the underwriting and relay the information to [redacted] had the authority to deny loans before bringing them to [redacted] if they did not meet BOC's guidelines.

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[redacted] met Manafort and [redacted] one time in the spring of 2017. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues BOC had found with [redacted] [redacted] did not know how BOC uncovered the issues, but he recalled BOC had learned [redacted] This was a "major trigger" and "red flag" for [redacted] In addition, BOC learned that [redacted] [redacted] was not moving forward as they had anticipated.

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[redacted] Downgrading a loan meant adjusting the risk rating downward. This was a regulatory process for the purpose of internal and external audits. The bank is required to carry additional reserves depending on the risk ratings of their loans.

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The meeting with Manafort and [redacted] was to discuss what was happening with [redacted] and how the loan would be repaid. [redacted] was trying to assess the risk to the bank.

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The meeting took place at BOC's offices in Century City. [redacted] Manafort, [redacted] and possibly [redacted] were in attendance.

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During the meeting, Manafort and [redacted] [redacted] Manafort and [redacted] did not disclose that the default to their lender, Genesis Capital, was a monetary default due to non-payment. This would have been a relevant distinction to [redacted] as it meant they were not making payments on their loans.

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At some point, [redacted] learned that [redacted] [redacted] was not sure if he learned this before or after the meeting with Manafort and [redacted] was not sure how he learned about [redacted]

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[redacted] recalled Manafort saying he had [redacted] [redacted] to protect his investments. This was not particularly relevant to [redacted] except that it showed Manafort still had a vested interest in [redacted] and believed that there was [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 5 of 7

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[redacted]
[redacted]

Neither Manafort, nor [redacted] made any representations to BOC about changes in their personal financial situations. [redacted] believed that Manafort and [redacted] as guarantors, were still financially viable and did not believe there were any issues with their financial resources. [redacted]

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because he believed BOC would be able to turn to Manafort and [redacted] as a source of repayment.

After the meeting, [redacted] was aware of a significant amount of back and forth between BOC and Manafort and [redacted] in an effort to structure a repayment schedule. [redacted] was not a party to that back and forth. Based upon what was relayed to [redacted] a repayment schedule was not reached and the loan was transferred to BOC's Special Assets Group. [redacted] did not know the specifics, but believed a restructure was ultimately agreed upon and the bank has received [redacted]
[redacted]

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Generally, BOC requires borrowers and guarantors to provide updated financial documents on a quarterly basis. [redacted] did not know if Manafort or [redacted] ever provided updated financials.

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[redacted] was shown the CAM [redacted]
[redacted] was able to determine by reviewing the CAM that Manafort's income was a significantly relied upon factor in the cash flow analysis. Had BOC known information supplied by Manafort to support his income was falsified and inflated, the loan would not have moved forward.

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[redacted] explained that had underwriting known that Manafort's business' 2015 income was closer to \$400,000 rather than \$4.5 million, this would have been a two-fold issue. First, it would have raised the issue of character as information was being falsely represented to the bank. This issue alone would have caused [redacted] to deny this loan. [redacted] would likely have confronted Manafort with the discrepant information first to see if there was a reconcilable reason for it. If [redacted] determined that Manafort falsified information, he would deny the loan. [redacted] was not aware of this issue ever happening before at BOC.

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The second issue would have been the material impact a reduced income would have had on the DSC calculations. [redacted] did not believe

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 6 of 7

Manafort would have qualified for the loan had his business' income been only \$400,000 in 2015.

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[redacted] recalled that initially, Manafort and [redacted] sought a [redacted] line of credit. This amount was reduced to [redacted] when [redacted]

In review of Manafort's cash flow analysis on the CAM, [redacted] could tell that his 2015 income was relied upon and factored into his DSC ratio. Alexander stated that Manafort's 2012-2014 tax returns were used and averaged along with his 2015 P&L. [redacted] noted on the income worksheet, Manafort's income in 2014 was lower than previous years. It was not abnormal for self employed borrower's income to fluctuate. This was the reason BOC used a three year average and looked at the 2015 income. Alexander explained that BOC wanted an understanding of both historic cash flow and projected cash flow.

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Had BOC known Manafort's income in 2015 was significantly lower than 2014, this would have been a problematic downward trend. [redacted] did not believe Manafort's income would have met the 1.25X DSC threshold. It's possible the loan could have been restructured to a lower loan amount or a secured loan. [redacted] reiterated, had he known Manafort lied, he would have denied the loan for that reason alone.

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Use of Proceeds

Manafort and [redacted] indicated the proceeds of the BOC loan were going to be used for [redacted]

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[redacted] This was relevant information to BOC. Had BOC known Manafort and [redacted] were using the proceeds of the loan for [redacted]

[redacted] it may have negatively affected the loan. It may have caused the loan to be restructure to a different type of loan or resulted in the loan being denied. It definitely would have caused the primary source of repayment to be adjusted.

Had BOC learned after funding the loan that Manafort and [redacted] were not executing their business plan and not [redacted] as intended, it would have been troubling as BOC was relying primarily on the [redacted] to repay their loan. [redacted] did not believe such an issue would have caused BOC to issue a default notice.

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[redacted] loan was a business loan. The purpose of the loan and the use of the proceeds was supposed to be for business purposes. That said, [redacted] was not sure if there were any prohibited uses of the loan proceeds. Generally, it was difficult for BOC to know exactly how loan proceeds were used.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/13/2017 , Page 7 of 7

REO

[REDACTED] would not normally review a borrower's REO schedule and he did not believe he looked at Manafort's or [REDACTED] REOs. [REDACTED] was not aware of any issues related to Manafort's or [REDACTED] REOs.


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Had [REDACTED] known that Manafort misrepresented his ownership interest in various properties on his REO for the purpose of misleading the bank, he would most likely have declined the loan. If Manafort had not disclosed mortgage debt against his properties, this would be a character issue for [REDACTED]. If the lack of disclosure was due to an oversight, [REDACTED] would factor in the debt to the DSC. The additional debt would negatively affect the DSC, potentially to the point where the loan would not be approved. If the lack of disclosure was meant to mislead the bank, [REDACTED] would deny the loan.

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[REDACTED] recalled speaking with [REDACTED] one time. It was represented to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] represented [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] could not recall if he spoke with [REDACTED] before or after speaking with Manafort and [REDACTED] expressed to [REDACTED] that BOC was disappointed at the lack of timely response to requests for information. [REDACTED] could not recall any representations made by [REDACTED].

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/06/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] Address of [redacted] [redacted] cellular telephone number of [redacted] home telephone number of [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing [redacted] were [redacted] The interviewing team consisted of FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Staff Operations Specialist [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) L. Rush Atkinson and ASC Aaron Zelinsky.

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Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Atkinson verbally reviewed the

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[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] his previous job was at Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation (HRAGIF).

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Investigation on 09/13/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/05/2018

by [redacted]

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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 09/13

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 . On 09/13/2018 . Page 2 of 7

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[REDACTED]

At the end of January 2016, Denis KATSYV called and asked [REDACTED] if he would be interested in a job. [REDACTED] asked if the job was in I.T., and KATSYV responded that he would provide more info if [REDACTED] attended a meeting at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] attended the meeting at [REDACTED]. The meeting was already in progress when he arrived and they were discussing creating HRAGIF, although they hadn't settled on a name yet. The meeting participants were discussing adoption issues. Present for the meeting was KATSYV, Natalia VESELNITSKAYA, Rinat AKHMETSHIN, Ed LIEBERMAN, [REDACTED] and a couple of other people that [REDACTED] did not know and did not see again. Anatoli SAMOCHORNOV was not at the meeting. There was a translator present at the meeting for [REDACTED] and VESELNITSKAYA. [REDACTED] could only remember his first name of [REDACTED] only prior knowledge of the Magnitsky Act came from the media, and [REDACTED] described it as general information. [REDACTED] listened to the information being presented in the meeting to try understand what kind of job he would be getting.

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At the end of the meeting [REDACTED] was offered a job. [REDACTED] described his position as [REDACTED]. His duties included [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] His official title was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed it sounded more important than it was. [REDACTED] was also asked [REDACTED] was not a decision maker and did not direct anyone. AKHMETSHIN was the decision maker and told [REDACTED] who to meet. [REDACTED] did not work with VESELNITSKAYA but she was involved in HRAGIF working on the Russian side. VESELNITSKAYA was involved in working with Russia on adoption issues. Back then [REDACTED] did not know that VESELNITSKAYA was a lawyer or that she was a lawyer for KATSYV. It made sense to [REDACTED] now, looking back, based upon how VESELNITSKAYA was acting. [REDACTED] never met anyone who put money in except for KATSYV. Finding money wasn't [REDACTED] job, he assumed that only KATSYV and VESELNITSKAYA were doing that.

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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 09/13

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018

. On 09/13/2018 . Page 3 of 7

In the meeting they discussed why HRAGIF was started. [REDACTED] didn't know what KATSYV's interest was in starting HRAGIF, but assumed they wanted to change the name of the Global Magnitsky Act to the Global Human Violations Law, or something similar. [REDACTED] knew they wanted to take the name Magnitsky off. During the meeting [REDACTED] did not come up. [REDACTED] was just listening with the goal of finding out what his role was and if he could do it. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] KATSYV offered [REDACTED] the job at the meeting. In February 2016 HRAGIF was established as a 501(c)(4) in Delaware, but [REDACTED] was not involved in the incorporation which was conducted by the Baker and Hostetler Law Firm and LIEBERMAN. In [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received his first paycheck. [REDACTED] believed he officially started in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no involvement in HRAGIF between [REDACTED] and there was no work. [REDACTED] officially started working at HRAGIF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was paid approximately [REDACTED] a year while working at HRAGIF for helping to remove the name Magnitsky and help restart adoptions. [REDACTED] believed that removing the name Magnitsky would allow the Russians to lift the adoptions ban. There wasn't an indication that this was linked to a Russian government effort, but they believed that if they could remove the name Magnitsky they could then go to the Russian government which would lift the adoption ban in a quid pro quo scenario.

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[REDACTED] first met KATSYV, in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] he was travelling through [REDACTED] On his way back through [REDACTED] attended a social event where he first met KATSYV. [REDACTED] introduced him to KATSYV. [REDACTED] knew KATSYV through business ties. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not work for KATSYV, and [REDACTED] did not know how long they had known each other. The second time [REDACTED] saw KATSYV, he was again travelling through [REDACTED] and he went to a restaurant with [REDACTED] KATSYV came later to the same restaurant and ran in to [REDACTED]

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In [REDACTED] KATSYV called [REDACTED] and asked about [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] KATSYV wanted to know what [REDACTED] was doing, knew that [REDACTED] was in the U.S., and KATSYV was interested in getting [REDACTED]

(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 09/13

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 . On 09/13/2018 . Page 4 of 7

[REDACTED] KATSYV asked [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] phone number and said when he was in Washington D.C. he would call. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] had no involvement in HRAGIF.

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While working at HRAGIF, [REDACTED] did not speak with VESELNITSKAYA that often. At first she participated in the creation of the website and logo, as everyone else did. [REDACTED] never saw VESELNITSKAYA before that first meeting. [REDACTED] might have talked to VESELNITSKAYA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] might have talked with VESELNITSKAYA over phone calls and emails, but didn't remember texting with her.

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[REDACTED] first met Anatoli SAMOCHORNOV at the end of March to the beginning of April 2016. [REDACTED] understood that SAMOCHORNOV was working for VESELNITSKAYA as a translator on other things. For HRAGIF SAMOCHORNOV did translation and interpretation. AKHMETSHIN and LIEBERMAN worked as lobbyists for HRAGIF. Consultants included [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the firm COZEN O'CONNOR and the POTOMAC SQUARE GROUP. All of these individuals/firms received checks for services. [REDACTED] had no decisions in their hiring [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had first heard about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower when he was [REDACTED]
They were watching CNN and saw breaking news in which [REDACTED] recognized VESELNITSKAYA and AKHMETSHIN. [REDACTED] didn't remember SAMOCHORNOV being mentioned. [REDACTED] had not heard about the meeting before then, nor any mention of a meeting with the Trump Campaign, Paul MANAFORT, or Jared KUSHNER. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone at HRAGIF providing information to the Trump Campaign. VESELNITSKAYA had never mentioned she had been at a meeting at Trump Tower during the event at the Newseum.

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On approximately [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] received a phone call from SAMOCHORNOV while he was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] missed the initial call and then called SAMOCHORNOV back. This was after [REDACTED] had been in [REDACTED] and seen the news on CNN.
[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 09/13
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 . On 09/13/2018 . Page 5 of 7

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(U) Interview of [redacted] on 09/13

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/13/2018 . Page 6 of 7

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
(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 09/13

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 . On 09/13/2018 . Page 7 of 7

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Various reporters have tried to reach out to [REDACTED] via email and phone calls. [REDACTED] has not responded. A Buzzfeed reporter had knocked on his door. No attempts have been made from the Russian press. The Russian Government has not tried to contact [REDACTED] The last time [REDACTED] had contact with KATSYV was a long time ago. None of the others have tried to contact him. [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On August 16, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]
cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of
employment, [redacted] After being advised of the
identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] works on [redacted] next door to [redacted]
[redacted] which is the last known address for [redacted]
[redacted] went to [redacted]
and remembers the [redacted] has
been closed for a couple of years, and [redacted] did not know where the
owner was located. [redacted] provided a number of [redacted] as the last
number he had for [redacted] [writer's note: Through open source
investigation, it appears [redacted]
home address [redacted] Agents called
the number provided by [redacted] and left a message.


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Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [redacted] Florida, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/18/2017

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/30/2017

[redacted] born [redacted] was contacted by the undersigned investigating agent at [redacted]. After being advised of the official identity of the undersigned, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is presently [redacted]. He stated that he is willing to answer any and all questions pertaining to his time at Bayrock and joint business deals with the Trump Organization.

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[redacted] estimated that Bayrock was created in approximately 2001 or 2002. Prior to that time, [redacted] Bayrock ceased to exist, he believed, sometime between 2006 and 2008. The world financial crisis led, [redacted] stated, to the halting of any potential or ongoing projects Bayrock was undertaking.

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[redacted] recalled two projects Bayrock undertook with the Trump Organization. One project, based in Miami, was left unfinished. The second, Trump SoHo, did proceed. In 2006, [redacted] began pulling out of the project as the crisis started. He eventually concluded his involvement with Trump SoHo by 2007.

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[redacted] discussed certain individuals that worked for Bayrock. [redacted] was Bayrock's [redacted] and a "good guy." [redacted] was largely responsible for [redacted]. Felix Sater was in charge of identifying potential real estate deals.

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In either 2005 or 2006, [redacted] met with [redacted] and told him that Sater had criminal convictions in his past. [redacted] consulted with his attorney [redacted] who told him that Sater had to take a lower profile role in the business. Sater eventually left Bayrock shortly thereafter (in possibly 2005 or 2006). [redacted] saw Sater in Florida a few years later at a social function.

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In the course of Bayrock's dealings with the Trump Organization, [redacted] stated that "attorneys dealt with attorneys, financial officers dealt with financial officers." Sater, he stated, would know all the specifics of who

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/25/2017 at [redacted] (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/25/2017

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 08/25/2017 . Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED] dealt with whom. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] at the Trump Organization, was his principal contact.

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[REDACTED] stated that he and Donald Trump had "no real relationship." He stated that they were not friends but had approximately five to ten business meetings. At their first meeting, [REDACTED] recalled Trump offering him a hamburger and a drink, both of which [REDACTED] refused. Trump asked him, "What can we do together?"

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b7C


Certain meetings between the two took place in [REDACTED] Bayrock offices. In these, [REDACTED] would introduce Trump to various businessmen from overseas. [REDACTED] stated that one of these individuals was [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that he will provide more details on all these matters in person. He is willing to meet [REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3119



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeney. Present during the interview was counsel for [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7CBackground

[redacted] attended [redacted] where she obtained her undergraduate degree in [redacted] has worked in [redacted] since graduating. [redacted] began working in [redacted] from [redacted] began working for [redacted] [redacted] moved from [redacted] and continued working for [redacted] in the [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7CManafort

Investigation on 12/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/21/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 2 of 12

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[redacted]
[redacted] Manafort became a client of [redacted] Private Wealth Management Group. Manafort moved his accounts from First Republic Bank (FRB) to UBS.

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When Manafort was introduced to [redacted] group, [redacted] Manafort had [redacted] in cash accounts, a net worth of approximately [redacted] and that he generated income primarily from his political consulting business. [redacted]
[redacted] Manafort wanted [redacted] group to oversee his investment portfolio and assist him with any lending needs.

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Manafort was an average to slightly smaller than average client for [redacted] group. Manafort's needs seemed similar to other clients [redacted] group managed.

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When Manafort was transitioning his accounts to UBS, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 3 of 12

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Manafort was associated with the following entities: Ramshead, a horse farm in Florida; Daisy Manafort; John Hannah, a real estate holding company which owned a property at Trump Tower in New York; MC Brooklyn Holdings, a real estate holding company; MC Soho Holdings, a reale state holding company; LOAV; and Lil Red.

DMP was Manafort's political consulting business. DMP did not maintain accounts at UBS. [REDACTED]

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Manafort obtained a line of credit in the name of Lil Red. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Manafort used the proceeds of this line of credit to purchase securities. This was a prohibited use for the line of credit. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Manafort would have known that he could not use the funds in this manner as it is indicated on the line of credit documentation.

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b7Cb6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 4 of 12

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b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

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[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED] was referred to [REDACTED] email which read, "Because there is a DTI and LTV exception on the loan, it does need to be reviewed with the bank's credit officer."

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b7C

[REDACTED] understood DTI to mean debt to income, or a ration of the borrower's debt versus the borrower's income. [REDACTED] understood LTV to be loan to value, or the amount of the loan versus the value of the asset. [REDACTED]

b6
b7CBaxter Street

Initially, when Manafort was looking for a mortgage through UBS, he was trying to use a property on Baxter Street as collateral. Manafort said he needed the loan [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 5 of 12

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b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

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b7C

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED] was directed to the [REDACTED] email which read, [REDACTED] explained you would like to cancel the mortgage on Baxter and explore the process for your Trump Tower property."

Many of the documents collected for the Baxter Street mortgage were used for the Trump Tower mortgage, such as: tax returns, bank statements and other income supporting documentation. Some documents had to be redone to reflect the correct property. Information relating to Manafort's other property was also likely re-used for the Trump Tower mortgage.

The mortgage banker for the Trump Tower mortgage was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] there was a different mortgage banker for the Baxter Street mortgage.

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When the Trump Tower mortgage began, [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated [REDACTED] between [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the subject line, [REDACTED] explained that this was the [REDACTED]

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/20/2017 . Page 6 of 12

[REDACTED] The first call was an introductory call. The second call, or Mortgage Registration Call, was when the mortgage banker would lock the rate and review the information provided by Manafort verbally.

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The purpose of reviewing the information verbally was to verify that the information was accurate so loan documents could be generated and a letter of approval could be issued. On the call, the mortgage banker runs through the information and the borrower verifies the accuracy. The information verified includes identifying information, such as date of birth and social security number as well as, income, liability and asset information. Based upon the information provided by the borrower, the loan application is generated.

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Loan Application

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED] Attached to this email was a series of mortgage documents and a Form 1003 Residential Loan Application for Manafort's loan on Trump Tower.

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
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[REDACTED] the information in the 1003 was input by the mortgage banker but was based upon information provided by Manafort and verified for accuracy during the Mortgage Registration Call.

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[REDACTED] Typically, mortgages take 45-60 days, but Manafort's took

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 7 of 12

longer. [REDACTED] the delay had something to do with the fact that the appraisals for Trump Tower came in very far apart.

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[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email between [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line, [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
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[REDACTED] did not recognize the email address "ccquestions@trumporg.com".

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b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email between [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] The email had an attachment titled, [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 8 of 12

[REDACTED]

In the email on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
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[REDACTED] was asked to review the attachment. [REDACTED] was asked why some properties were indicated as "Owned by" and then an LLC name. [REDACTED] understood there were certain parameters for properties held in the name of LLCs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line, [REDACTED] Attached to this email was a homeowners insurance declaration for Baxter Street. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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At some point, [REDACTED] recalled learning of a property owned by Manafort that she did not know of previously.

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[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email between [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
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[REDACTED] TEXT MESSAGE

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 9 of 12

[REDACTED] was shown a screen shot of text messages between [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] was referred to her text message
which read, [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated [REDACTED]
to [REDACTED] with the subject line
[REDACTED] was referred to the portion of [REDACTED]
email which read, [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with the subject line [REDACTED] Attached
to this email was a Residential Loan Application Supplemental
Questionnaire (RLAS) signed by Manafort.

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

TEXT MESSAGE

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 10 of 12

was shown a screen shot of text messages between dated was referred to message which read,

b6
b7Cb6
b7C

EMAIL

was shown an email between dated with the subject line,

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

TEXT MESSAGE

was shown text messages between dated in or around

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 11 of 12

[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email between [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]
with the subject line [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C


[REDACTED] EMAIL

[REDACTED] was shown an email from Rick Gates [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]
with the subject line [REDACTED] There was an invoice attached to this
email which purported to show DMP International LLC invoicing "To Whom It
May Concern" [REDACTED] for "Services rendered per the consultancy
agreement pertaining to the parliamentary elections."

[REDACTED]

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7CClosing Manafort's Accountsb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 12/20/2017 , Page 12 of 12

b7A
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/13/2018

[redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Assistant US Attorney [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Brandon L. Van Grack, and Forensic Accountants [redacted]. Also present on the conference call was [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[redacted] met Paul MANAFORT for the first time [redacted] around the time of the [redacted] MANAFORT was looking for [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
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[redacted] Property

A company was formed for the [redacted] purchase, but [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/29/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/02/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 06/29/2018 . Page 2 of 6

MANAFORT Relationship

DAVIS MANAFORT PARTNERS and DMP were lobbying firms. [REDACTED] did not have a personal relationship with MANAFORT. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] for MANAFORT, [REDACTED] He did not think that he [REDACTED] role was [REDACTED]

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b7C

MANAFORT would have been the person who [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would communicate with RICK GATES. [REDACTED] had limited communication with MANAFORT. Most communication was with GATES.

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[REDACTED] GATES was definitely acting at MANAFORT's direction. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not discuss MANAFORT's work with him.

MANAFORT told [REDACTED] he would be working with GATES. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not have very frequent communication with MANAFORT. He might have started communicating with MANAFORT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] met with MANAFORT more frequently [REDACTED] when he [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not involved with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] would typically communicate with GATES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] discussions with GATES until he

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FBI(19cv1278)-3133

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED] . On 06/29/2018 . Page 3 of 6

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b7C

[REDACTED] He could not remember a conversation with MANAFORT about money. GATES would reach out to [REDACTED]

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b7C

Ex.1 Email [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MANAFORT from [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] property was [REDACTED] Later on, [REDACTED] thought that [REDACTED] lived there and then moved out.

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b7C

[REDACTED] believed the [REDACTED] property was in [REDACTED] He recalled there was a [REDACTED]

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Ex. 2 - [REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3134

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 06/29/2018 . Page 4 of 6

[redacted] was probably a brokerage firm.

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[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] did not sound familiar to [redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of MANAFORT doing work in [redacted] relied on [redacted]

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[redacted]

Ex. 3 - [redacted] to MANAFORT relating to [redacted]

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[redacted] was aware the [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] MANAFORT was listed as the managing member [redacted]

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[redacted]

For the [redacted] properties, [redacted] may have been involved [redacted] For the [redacted] property, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] recalls that the [redacted] purchase was [redacted]

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[redacted]

The [redacted]

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[redacted] did not have to explain MANAFORT's [redacted] was never involved in the [redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3135

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 06/29/2018 . Page 5 of 6

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] was not involved in [REDACTED] He
was involved in a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was much more involved in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was not
involved with [REDACTED] He does
not get involved [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Property Loan

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A private lender made a loan for this property in the amount of
approximately [REDACTED] The property was purchased for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] properties

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[REDACTED] was familiar with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He recalls the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was [REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3136

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 06/29/2018 . Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted] cares about MANAFORT and does not want anything bad to happen to him. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3137

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On October 2, 2017, [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b3
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The writer asked [redacted]

b3
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
[redacted]

[redacted]

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Attached to this document is the subpoena emailed to [redacted] and is included as 1A evidence.

b3
b6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 10/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2017by [redacted]b6
b7A
b7C
b7E



b7A

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/29/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI - Special Counsel's Office at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Present during the interview were Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] and [redacted] and Intelligence Analyst [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] wanted to share information with the Special Counsel's Office regarding his interactions with [redacted] [redacted] experience with them started during the [redacted]

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In [redacted] worked for [redacted] with [redacted] and [redacted] who were trying to [redacted] eventually became the [redacted] REINCE PRIEBUS and Senator RAND PAUL.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/14/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 2 of 7

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted] [Note: The FBI requested any documents [Redacted] still had from [Redacted] but did not receive those documents.]

[Redacted]

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3143

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b6
b7A
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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview [REDACTED] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 6 of 7b6
b7A
b7Cb6
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b7Cb6
b7A
b7Cb6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED] said he has a sporadic relationship with [REDACTED] but it wouldn't be unusual for [REDACTED] to reach out to [REDACTED] was close with [REDACTED] and they talked a lot. [REDACTED] used to [REDACTED] for BANNON and TRUMP. The [REDACTED] have always [REDACTED] BANNON. [REDACTED] met with BANNON several times.

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[REDACTED] is a huge conspiracy theorist and hardcore libertarian who thinks people are listening in on his conversations. [REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3144

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 7 of 7

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] may be willing to talk to the Special Counsel's Office. This would be based on whether she wants to burn TRUMP and whether she sees any ties to people she wants to protect. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After that, [REDACTED] went to work for [REDACTED] had been the [REDACTED] had introduced [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and warned [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] probably talked with PARSCALE and major donors.

[REDACTED] said sometime in 2015, BUSH's emails were published after being scraped by Russian or Ukrainian IP addresses. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was asked who knew about his meeting with the Special Counsel's Office. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] [REDACTED] knew about the meeting. Additionally, [REDACTED] knew he was in Washington D.C. [REDACTED] recalled that about [REDACTED] months ago he received a call from [REDACTED] who asked [REDACTED] talk to the FBI or Special Counsel's Office regarding [REDACTED] specifically regarding [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was asked what he knew about [REDACTED] said it was recently opened but he didn't know much about it.


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FBI(19cv1278)-3145

[REDACTED] SM-2230634 [REDACTED]

- 1 of 1 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/27/2018

[REDACTED] was interviewed at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, District of Columbia. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent [REDACTED] and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A copy of the [REDACTED] was saved to the 1A file.


Investigation on 10/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] SM-2230634

Date drafted 02/27/2018

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/08/2017

[REDACTED]
interviewed at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, District of Columbia. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent [REDACTED] and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:


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Author requested information about [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] SM-2230634Date drafted 12/08/2017by [REDACTED]b6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

On November 29, 2017 at approximately 10:30 AM, FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney LAWRENCE R. ATKINSON spoke with [redacted] on the telephone. [redacted] are attorneys from [redacted] [redacted] advised of their continued representation of [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing Agent, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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
Investigation on 11/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/04/2017by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/08/2017

(U) On 12/06/2017 SA [redacted] interviewed CHARLES BOYD, USAF, Retired, (BOYD) over the phone at [redacted] SA [redacted] called BOYD and left a voicemail stating SA [redacted] was from the FBI and wanted to speak with BOYD regarding the Center for the National Interest. BOYD returned SA [redacted] call and after being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, BOYD provided the following information:

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(U) [redacted] He was willing to talk, however wished to continue after he had [redacted] [redacted] BOYD requested that SA [redacted] call him at the end of the week to reschedule.


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Investigation on 12/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/06/2017

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] explained that The Federal Savings Bank's (TFSB) residential loan underwriting is handled by a Operations Group in Maryland and Underwriters in Chicago. The residential loan underwriters are [redacted]

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TFSB is not a hard money lender. TFSB is somewhat of a hybrid between hard money lenders and traditional bank lenders.

[redacted] was shown the Form 1003 for Manafort's loans against [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] further identified by bates numbers TFSB0085889-TFSB0085895 and TFSB0085912-TFSB0085917 respectively.

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
Investigation on 07/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/11/2018

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 09/12/2018

Alexandria Sheriff's Department [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by
FBI Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity
of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

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Paul Manafort's defense lawyers provided the Alexandria Jail with a
laptop which was intended for Manafort's use reviewing discovery related
to his current and pending trial. The laptop was only permitted to be
used by Manafort at certain times and while in the Alexandria Jail's law
library. While not in use, the laptop remained in the Watch Commander's
office.

[redacted] was provided with the username and password for the laptop to
ensure that the laptop could not connect to the internet and was not being
used to communicate with anyone. There are two accounts on the laptop, a
User Account and an Admin Account. [redacted] had both usernames and
passwords.

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When Manafort's defense lawyers originally brought the laptop to the
Alexandria Jail, [redacted] accessed it using the usernames and passwords
provided. However, at some point, the laptop was picked up by Manafort's
defense lawyers and then subsequently brought back the morning of August
21, 2018. When the laptop was returned, [redacted] was able to access the
User Account, but not the Admin Account as the password did not work.

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A paralegal, first name unknown (FNU) [redacted] left a note for [redacted]
which asked if [redacted] had changed the password to the Admin Account
because [redacted] could not access it and the password did not work. [redacted]
had not changed the password and took [redacted] note to mean that neither
[redacted] nor Manafort's defense lawyers had changed the password
either. [redacted] was unable to access the Admin Account.

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When [redacted] brought the laptop to Alexandria Jail on August 21, 2018, he
also brought two USB drives. One of the USB drives had a sticky note
affixed to it which read "Blank". [redacted] plugged in the USB drive which

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Investigation on 08/21/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/10/2018

by [redacted]

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(U) Alexandria Sheriff's Department IT

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] . On 08/21/2018 . Page 2 of 2

was supposed to be blank and noticed the memory was approximately half full. However, when [REDACTED] opened the drive, no files appeared. [REDACTED] configured the drive to show "hidden files" and saw a folder named "trash" which contained a large number of hidden files. [REDACTED] did not open any of the files.

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Due to the change of password and the hidden files, [REDACTED] notified Alexandria Sheriff's Department [REDACTED]

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Date of entry: 11/09/2017

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Jay Carafano. On 09/12/2017, Page 2 of 3

weapons and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). CARAFANO provided a brief from a HERITAGE FOUNDATION document titled, "The Index of U.S. Military Strength." CARAFANO left a copy of his briefing materials with TRUMP and stated the interviewing Agents could find a copy of the same documents on the HERITAGE FOUNDATION website. Writer identified a copy of the 2016 Index of Military Strength document on the HERITAGE FOUNDATION website. A copy the document is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

CARAFANO could not remember if there was a specific agenda for the meeting or if anyone had taken notes during it. CARAFANO remembered the topic of Russia was brought up by a young man with dark hair, who spoke about energy issues and stated he had connections who could get TRUMP, or TRUMP's people, in contact with Russian president, VLADIMIR PUTIN. CARAFANO did not know the young man and never saw him again.

When asked what the response was to the proposal of arranging a meeting with TRUMP and PUTIN, CARAFANO stated he believed the SESSIONS had voiced his concerns about such a meeting and how it could be a violation of the Logan Act. CARAFANO recalled the topic of Russia may have been brought up as a result of discussions related to the Ukraine and not as a result of any discussions about nuclear matters related to Russia.

CARAFANO then explained that each individual had brought their own topic to the discussion and TRUMP seemed to be the most intrigued by [REDACTED] presentation on the nuclear triad and NATO. CARAFANO specifically remembered [REDACTED] had apologized to TRUMP for taking up too much time during his brief. CARAFANO did not remember any further discussions about Russia.

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CARAFANO attended the Republican National Convention (RNC) in Cleveland, Ohio in July 2016. During the RNC, the HERITAGE FOUNDATION partnered with the U.S. State Department to host an educational event which was widely attended by approximately 800 to 900 people. The attendees included a variety of foreign ambassadors from all around the world, who were invited by the U.S. State Department. CARAFANO introduced SESSIONS when he spoke on a panel during the RNC, along with HERITAGE FOUNDATION representative, [REDACTED] That panel focused on topics related to Russia, China, and Europe.

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When asked whether or not CARAFANO was present when SESSIONS met with the Russian Ambassador at the RNC, CARAFANO stated he was. CARAFANO remembered a line had formed to meet with SESSIONS and the Russian ambassador had stood in that line with many others to meet with him. CARAFANO recalled SESSIONS met with the Ukrainian ambassador immediately following and stated the meeting with the Russian ambassador was a very

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[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Jay Carafano. On 09/12/2017, Page 3 of 3

impromptu engagement. CARAFANO remembered seeing CARTER PAGE in the hospitality area at the reception event for the ambassadors but did not observe him speaking with the Russian ambassador during that event.

CARAFANO provided another candidate brief to TRUMP after the RNC, at the TRUMP TOWER in New York. The meeting was chaired by RUDY GIULIANI. SESSIONS and MICHAEL FLYNN were also there. CARAFANO recalled the topic of the meeting had focused on homeland security and the border and did not involve any discussions about Russia.

CARAFANO was part of the presidential transition team, the State Department transition team and the Department of Homeland Security transition team. During his time on those teams, CARAFANO never had any substantive discussions about policy related to Russia nor did he observe any activity which he would consider to be evidence of collusion with the Russian government.

Enclosed for the file as a physical 1A item is a copy of a photograph of the March 31st meeting and a corresponding seating chart. Both items were shown to CARAFANO during this interview. A copy of the items are enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

DAN CASSERLY, Vice President and United States (U.S.) Country Head of Government Affairs at NOVARTIS CORPORATION (NOVARTIS), was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Assistant Special Counsel [REDACTED] at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. CASSERLY was accompanied by NOVARTIS outside counsel [REDACTED] from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, CASSERLY provided the following information:

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CASSERLY was not part of any one commercial business at NOVARTIS. As part of CASSERLY's role at NOVARTIS, CASSERLY maintained a functional relationship with [REDACTED] at NOVARTIS' global entity, NOVARTIS AG. Within the U.S., CASSERLY reported to [REDACTED] CASSERLY had approximately 20 to 25 employees that worked for him.

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CASSERLY was responsible for external advocacy for NOVARTIS. As part of CASSERLY's role, CASSERLY interfaced with the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Presidential administration, and pharmaceutical trade associations.

CASSERLY knew the name MICHAEL COHEN from headlines in the newspapers. In early 2017, JOE JIMENEZ reached out to CASSERLY via email about entering into a contractual relationship with COHEN. JIMENEZ asked that CASSERLY meet with COHEN to discuss using COHEN as a consultant. Prior to meeting with COHEN in New York City, CASSERLY performed some GOOGLE searches on COHEN.

CASSERLY was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000235 through NVS_00000236. CASSERLY did not receive any sort of notification from JIMENEZ prior to receiving this email. CASSERLY's relationship with JIMENEZ revolved around CASSERLY's dealings with U.S. government affairs.

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Investigation on 11/09/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/21/2017

by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dan Casserly , On 11/09/2017 , Page 2 of 6

DONALD TRUMP was an unknown candidate. After TRUMP won the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, everyone in Washington, DC suggested they knew TRUMP and that companies should hire them as a consultant. COHEN was similar in that regard. When JIMENEZ said he wanted to hire COHEN as a consultant for NOVARTIS, CASSERLY [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At that time, the only thing CASSERLY knew about COHEN was from the news.

CASSERLY did not recall any discussions with JIMENEZ prior to meeting with COHEN in New York. In preparation for the meeting with COHEN, CASSERLY had discussions with KENDRIS.

Referring to the email Bates stamped NVS 00000235 through NVS 00000236, CASSERLY noted that [REDACTED] When JIMENEZ said "Confidentially," in his email to CASSERLY, CASSERLY understood JIMENEZ to mean that he did not want CASSERLY discussing the COHEN relationship with others. FELIX EHRAT brought KENDRIS in the loop on the COHEN relationship. CASSERLY believed the only people at NOVARTIS that knew about COHEN being hired as a consultant for NOVARTIS were CASSERLY, EHRAT, KENDRIS, and JIMENEZ.

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CASSERLY was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000205. CASSERLY recalled sending this email to JIMENEZ. CASSERLY sent an email like this to all NOVARTIS executives every year. This email was not drafted and sent to JIMENEZ because of COHEN. However, CASSERLY offered it JIMENEZ that he (CASSERLY) discuss the "stakeholder targets" with COHEN when CASSERLY was scheduled to meet with COHEN on March 1, 2017. CASSERLY did this because JIMENEZ wanted to know if COHEN could provide access to the TRUMP administration.

Lobbying was something that could be interpreted as advocacy. Consulting was someone assisting with strategy and providing advice. In the past, NOVARTIS hired former members of Congress as consultants. CASSERLY had no predetermined judgment of what COHEN would be doing for NOVARTIS. CASSERLY was not sure how JIMENEZ intended to use COHEN.

On March 1, 2017, CASSERLY attended an in-person meeting with COHEN, KENDRIS, and EHRAT at NOVARTIS' New York office. This was the first time CASSERLY spoke to COHEN. COHEN was wearing a suit and a large watch. COHEN said he was [REDACTED] EHRAT was based in [REDACTED] CASSERLY was not sure if EHRAT flew in just to attend the meeting with COHEN.

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Just before the meeting with COHEN, CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT met to discuss how NOVARTIS could use COHEN. CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dan Casserly , On 11/09/2017 , Page 3 of 6

discussed what they thought COHEN knew, whether or not he knew anyone in the TRUMP administration, and the types of issues they considered engaging him on.

During the meeting with COHEN, COHEN was asked what he knew about NOVARTIS. Disappointingly, COHEN did not know a lot. COHEN did no due diligence in advance of the meeting. COHEN asked if NOVARTIS had a presence in the U.S. EHRAT provided COHEN with an overview of NOVARTIS, but COHEN was quick to cut EHRAT off. COHEN talked a lot about his relationship with the TRUMP administration. COHEN had his cellphone out and checked it constantly during the meeting. CASSERLY had the impression that COHEN was trying to demonstrate how close he was to the TRUMP administration. In the middle of the meeting, COHEN answered an incoming call. COHEN said it was a celebrity or someone from TMZ. COHEN put his phone on speaker, but did not tell the person on the phone that they were on speaker. CASSERLY described the incident as awkward and uncomfortable. CASSERLY believed COHEN was [REDACTED]

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At one point during the meeting with COHEN, CASSERLY provided COHEN with a stakeholder map. As CASSERLY went down the list of individuals on the stakeholder map, CASSERLY asked COHEN about his relationship with each person. There was a focus on [REDACTED] and some discussion of lowering drug prices for veterans. COHEN said NOVARTIS did not need any of the individuals on the stakeholder map because NOVARTIS could just go through COHEN for access to the TRUMP administration.

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One idea COHEN had during the meeting was for NOVARTIS to build a manufacturing facility in Indiana as a way of bringing manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. COHEN said doing so would look good for TRUMP and could build favor with TRUMP. COHEN may have used this as an example of what he could do for NOVARTIS, but CASSERLY thought COHEN was also serious about NOVARTIS building a manufacturing facility in Indiana. At this point in the meeting, issues important to NOVARTIS were no longer being discussed. CASSERLY felt as if the tables were turning and NOVARTIS was working for COHEN.

CASSERLY brought pen and paper to the meeting with COHEN. However, CASSERLY did not write anything down because nothing in the meeting was noteworthy.

CASSERLY did not know how much COHEN was being paid by NOVARTIS, but heard it was a lot of money.

After the meeting with COHEN on March 1, 2017 concluded, CASSERLY questioned how such a contract with COHEN happened. CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT agreed to ask JIMENEZ. At a later time, JIMENEZ told CASSERLY that a

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dan Casserly . On 11/09/2017 . Page 4 of 6

friend recommended COHEN. JIMENEZ's friend said COHEN was only taking five clients, so NOVARTIS needed to get in quickly if they wanted to hire COHEN as a consultant. Sort of jokingly, JIMENEZ told CASSERLY that [REDACTED] CASSERLY did not know who JIMENEZ's friend was that recommended COHEN.

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CASSERLY noted that things often happen at an executive level that CASSERLY did not necessarily understand. JIMENEZ thought hiring COHEN was an opportunity. CASSERLY has had consultants fizzle out quickly in the past. There was so little known about COHEN prior to meeting him.

NOVARTIS' priority issues were also pharmaceutical industry issues. CASSERLY was concerned about TRUMP's critiques on drug prices. CASSERLY did not discuss this concern with KENDRIS and EHRAT. There was talk by the TRUMP administration of healthcare reform. For these reasons, NOVARTIS needed to speak with individuals in the TRUMP administration.

CASSERLY's first and only interaction with COHEN was the March 1, 2017 meeting. After meeting with COHEN, CASSERLY had discussions with KENDRIS and EHRAT about figuring out how to use COHEN that was not risky or dangerous to NOVARTIS. CASSERLY felt like COHEN was [REDACTED] KENDRIS and EHRAT agreed with CASSERLY. CASSERLY [REDACTED] so CASSERLY did not want to share NOVARTIS' positions with COHEN. CASSERLY did not believe COHEN had access to the individuals he claimed to have access to. COHEN tried too hard.

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During the meeting with COHEN on March 1, 2017, there was brief discussion regarding a NOVARTIS product that was awaiting approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The approval by the FDA was delayed due to a manufacturing plant issue being caused by TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS (TEVA). COHEN said [REDACTED] Given COHEN's comment, CASSERLY thought about [REDACTED] as a potential issue when it came to COHEN. CASSERLY was not sure if he ever expressed his concerns about COHEN [REDACTED] to anyone at NOVARTIS.

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After the meeting with COHEN, CASSERLY may have raised [REDACTED] with COHEN with KENDRIS and EHRAT.

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JIMENEZ told CASSERLY to meet with COHEN. However, CASSERLY also wanted to understand JIMENEZ's relationship with COHEN. After the meeting with COHEN, EHRAT took CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT's collective insights regarding COHEN back to JIMENEZ. CASSERLY did not know if EHRAT raised [REDACTED] when EHRAT spoke with JIMENEZ.

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CASSERLY had no telephone calls with COHEN after meeting with COHEN on March 1, 2017. CASSERLY received no insights about the TRUMP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dan Casserly , On 11/09/2017 , Page 5 of 6

administration from COHEN. CASSERLY did not think there was much interaction between JIMENEZ and COHEN either.

CASSERLY could not recall when, but after retaining COHEN, JIMENEZ traveled to DC to attend a PHRMA Board meeting. JIMENEZ wanted to use COHEN to set up meetings with individuals in the TRUMP administration while in DC. CASSERLY did not ask COHEN to set up any meetings. CASSERLY did not know if JIMENEZ asked COHEN to set up meetings. If someone did ask COHEN to set up a meeting, COHEN was unsuccessful in doing so. COHEN would have set up meetings for JIMENEZ that COHEN thought JIMENEZ should attend rather than meetings JIMENEZ requested COHEN set up. COHEN needed to be managed.

Regarding CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT's collective view of COHEN, CASSERLY had the impression that JIMENEZ [REDACTED]

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CASSERLY would be surprised if TRUMP knew about COHEN's relationship with NOVARTIS.

CASSERLY was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000247. CASSERLY's comment in this email about [REDACTED] was in reference to his continued impression of COHEN from the March 1, 2017 meeting. At the conclusion of the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, there was some discussion between CASSERLY, KENDRIS, and EHRAT about a future breakfast/coffee meeting with COHEN in DC.

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Consultants CASSERLY worked with at NOVARTIS typically ranged between [REDACTED] per month on the low-end to [REDACTED] per month on the high-end. Former Congressmen NOVARTIS hired as consultants ranged on the high-end of [REDACTED] per month. Within the political sphere, higher dollar contracts were not unusual. One of NOVARTIS' consultants that CASSERLY used during the OBAMA administration, [REDACTED]

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CASSERLY was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000922. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] CASSERLY included the bullet point "Michael Cohen engagement" in this email to JIMENEZ because CASSERLY had not spoken with JIMENEZ about COHEN since CASSERLY met COHEN on March 1, 2017. CASSERLY used this one-on-one discussion with JIMENEZ as an opportunity to speak with JIMENEZ directly about his (CASSERLY's) impressions of COHEN. CASSERLY also wanted JIMENEZ's perspective on how to use COHEN. It was during this one-on-one that JIMENEZ told CASSERLY that he (JIMENEZ)

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[REDACTED] JIMENEZ did not pressure CASSERLY to use COHEN, nor did JIMENEZ tell CASSERLY how he should use COHEN. In fact, CASSERLY felt like JIMENEZ implied that

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Dan Casserly , On 11/09/2017 , Page 6 of 6

CASSERLY should not use COHEN. CASSERLY knew after the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN that he did not want to use COHEN as a consultant. CASSERLY was aware that COHEN's contract was for one year.


CASSERLY did not know all the reasons why NOVARTIS continued to pay COHEN when the company was not using him. CASSERLY noted that it could have been fear of reputational harm if the contract was terminated. COHEN did have some access to what was a very volatile TRUMP administration. NOVARTIS may have been trying to determine if there was value in having COHEN on retainer.

CASSERLY would have preferred to have the in-person meeting with COHEN before hiring him. After meeting COHEN, CASSERLY would not have hired COHEN for what CASSERLY did for NOVARTIS. However, CASSERLY did not know if that would have been the determining factor for whether or not COHEN was hired by NOVARTIS. If COHEN was able to set up meetings with individuals from, for example, Health and Human Services (HHS) or the Vice President, then COHEN may have been valuable. However, CASSERLY [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: All emails and documents shown to CASSERLY are included in the attached 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/22/2018

[redacted] was interviewed via telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the Agent and the nature of
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]
[redacted]


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Investigation on 08/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2018

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2018

[redacted] DOB: [redacted] was interviewed at Dulles International Airport, Dulles, Virginia. The interview was surreptitiously recorded by the interviewing Agents. The recording has been documented under separate cover and has been submitted to ELSUR evidence. Present for the interview were SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] was advised of the voluntary nature of the interview and that the interview could end at any moment of his choosing. [redacted] was further advised that lying to an FBI Agent was a federal offense. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information. The below is a summary of the recorded statements made by [redacted]

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[redacted] indicated he did not have a traveling companion on the date of the captioned interview. As the Agents were walking with [redacted] to the interview room, [redacted] advised he was planning on being in the Washington, D.C. area for 48 hours, after which he would be going home to see [redacted] the following day that he would be attending, however, he had not booked a hotel yet. [redacted] showed the Agents details for the event on his phone and advised President Donald Trump (Trump) would be in attendance.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Investigation on 03/19/2018 at Dulles, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/24/2018

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 03
/19/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/19/2018, Page 2 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3166

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 03
Continuation of FD-302 of /19/2018 . On 03/19/2018 . Page 3 of 6

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FBI(19cv1278)-3167

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 03
/19/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/19/2018, Page 4 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 03
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /19/2018 . On 03/19/2018 . Page 5 of 6

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 03
/19/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 03/19/2018 , Page 6 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


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[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/30/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 333 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001. Present for the interview was FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. [redacted] was accompanied by his attorneys, [redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] [redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted]

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[redacted] was provided with a proffer agreement for this interview. He and his attorneys reviewed the agreement and [redacted] signed it. [redacted] was advised that intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 08/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/24/2018by [redacted]b3
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(U) Interview of [redacted] on 8/24

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018. , On 08/24/2018 , Page 2 of 4

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(U) Interview of [redacted] on 8/24

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018. On 08/24/2018, Page 3 of 4

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(U) Interview of [redacted] on 8/24

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018.

. On 08/24/2018 . Page 4 of 4

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
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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/19/2017

(U) On or about 06/15/2017 [] utilized phone number [] and called SA [] regarding an answering machine message that SA [] left [] on 06/13/2017. In the message, SA [] identified himself and requested to interview [] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [] provided the following information:

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(U) [] advised that it took him a few days to return the call because SA [] called his answering machine at his home [] and not his cellphone. [] provided the cellphone number [] was calling from []

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(U) [] was a [] and previously knew Carter Page (Page) who worked at Merrill Lynch. Later, Page worked for the 2008 Senator John McCain Presidential Campaign [] It was typical for people who wanted to help in a presidential campaign to want to become delegates for the candidates.

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(U) Page called [] or possibly saw him at a party, and asked [] specifically if [] could put Page in touch with the Donald J. Trump Presidential Campaign (Campaign). [] main contact at the Campaign was Corey Lewandowski. [] introduced Page to Lewandowski via email. (AGENT COMMENT: [] later provided that email to SA [] which is attached as a 1A).

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(U) When asked about further contact, [] said that Page emailed [] and asked to call on 05/11/2016, [] did not elaborate further. Additionally, Page recently sent an email warning [] that his name would be in the press as having introduced Page to the campaign. [] felt that it was nice of Page to warn him. After the warning, [] has been contacted by reporters who asked the same questions as SA [] Other than these occasions he has had no contact with Page.


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Investigation on 06/15/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)

File # [] Date drafted 06/16/2017

by []

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 03-05-2020

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Date of entry 11/28/2017

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed in Washington, D.C. Also present for the interview was Senior Assistant Special Counsel ZAINAB AHMAD. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] currently resides at [redacted] Previous residences include [redacted] She lived in [redacted] while working on the Trump campaign. Her cell phone number is [redacted] [redacted] She was previously issued a government cell phone but does not recall the phone number. [redacted] currently uses the email account [redacted] She has used other email addresses from the Trump presidential transition team and from the National Security Council (NSC).

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[redacted]

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[redacted] moved to New York City in [redacted] to work on the Trump campaign. Later she transferred back to Washington, D.C. to work on the Trump presidential transition team. She later went to work at the National Security Council [redacted]

For electronic communication platforms, [redacted] has used Viber and WhatsApp to communicate with people overseas and while traveling overseas. She does not use Twitter direct messaging, Wicker, Cyber Dust, Signal, or Facebook to communicate. [redacted] has used Viber to communicate with WALID PHARES. She no longer uses Viber or WhatsApp and has deleted those applications from her cell phone.

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[redacted] got involved in the Trump campaign because she wanted to support Presidential candidate DONALD TRUMP. She knew PHARES was already involved in the campaign. PHARES got [redacted] a job interview with RICK DEARBORN, a senior policy aide for the campaign. DEARBORN brought [redacted] on board as a

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Investigation on 11/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/20/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] , On 11/20/2017 , Page 2 of 4

[REDACTED] She originally thought she would be working with PHARES but PHARES ended up not working on the campaign. Instead, [REDACTED] worked for J.D. GORDON on [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] went to the Republican National Convention in July, 2016. She worked as [REDACTED] She was not involved in anything related to the Republican Party Platform or with policy related to Ukraine. After the convention, [REDACTED] was assigned to the New York office of the campaign. [REDACTED] sat in the "war room" located on the 14th floor of Trump Tower. The "war room" was an open office setting with a series of conference tables. Only the senior campaign officials had offices. [REDACTED] and many others aides brought their own computers to the office every day. [REDACTED] worked mostly on [REDACTED] She was paid [REDACTED] per month for living expenses [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] STEVE MILLER and JOHN MASHBURN.

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[REDACTED] Other than PHARES, there was no one from the future Trump campaign on this trip.

In 2016, [REDACTED] was aware that PHARES planned to make a trip to Egypt. [REDACTED] wanted to go on the trip but was never asked. [REDACTED] was not involved in the planning of the trip and did not know specifics related to the trip.

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[REDACTED] received several emails from PHARES while he was on the 2016 trip to Egypt. [REDACTED] identified the attached email dated September 9, 2016, from PHARES to [REDACTED] The email indicated PHARES was trying to coordinate a meeting between President EL-SISI of Egypt and Presidential candidate TRUMP. A second email, also dated September 9, 2016, was sent from PHARES to [REDACTED] and also discusses a request for a meeting between President EL-SISI and Presidential candidate TRUMP. [REDACTED] believes the meeting was eventually coordinated through officials from the Egyptian Embassy and the Trump campaign. In communications using Viber with [REDACTED] around the time the emails were sent, PHARES emphasized the importance of the email messages to the campaign. [REDACTED] printed off copies of both emails and placed them on the chair of campaign chief executive STEVE BANNON as instructed by PHARES. [REDACTED] did not follow up with PHARES on the specifics of the trip.

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[REDACTED] helped write notes for a statement the campaign would release related to the meeting between TRUMP and Egyptian President EL-

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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of , On 11/20/2017, Page 3 of 4

SISI. These notes were not used. The Trump campaign communications team, specifically STEVEN MILLER and worked on the readout that was released.

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believes that PHARES may have traveled to the United Arab Emirates around the same time he went to Egypt.

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After the presidential election, joined the presidential transition team. She had expressed her interest in joining the team to retired general KEITH KELLOGG while he oversaw the national security team. was leading the NSC transition team and contacted offering her a position. continued to be paid per month living expenses and moved back to Washington, D.C.

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The presidential transition team was responsible for coordinating visits with foreign leaders. The team would receive requests from foreign governments, review them, and coordinate meetings. The meetings all took place in New York City and frequently involved foreign ministers. kept track of the meetings in a spreadsheet. The data was stored on the presidential transition team computer in an open shared drive.

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was aware of the December 2016 United Nations vote against the Israeli settlements from television coverage but does not remember any specific conversations about it while serving on the presidential transition team.

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does not recall any specific discussions about how the presidential transition team should respond to the article.

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(S) b3
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does not know about a call between TRUMP and Russian President VLADIMIR PUTIN.

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has traveled to Egypt times. She has contacts with many Egyptian officials. She was asked about her interactions with the following Egyptian nationals:


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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] , On 11/20/2017 , Page 4 of 4

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] knew a person named [REDACTED] but was unsure of the last name. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] She has spoken to him on the phone and seen him in person once or twice. She does not talk with him anymore.
- [REDACTED] does not know this individual.
- [REDACTED] has seen him at events but has no communication with him.
- [REDACTED] She stayed in touch with him for awhile. She last saw him at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] She has not had further contact with him.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/04/2019

SA [] and SA [] interviewed [] at the law offices of [] counsel, [] was present for the interview. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [] provided the following information:

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[] for Black, Manafort & Stone (BMS) [] Her job responsibilities included []

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When the firm expanded, []

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Throughout her tenure at BMS the firm had moved its offices. At different times, BMS had offices on Lee Street, Union Street and Fairfax Street.

Executives at the firm included [] PAUL MANAFORT, ROGER STONE, [] MANAFORT and STONE were lobbyists. [] did not engage in lobbying. [] was unsure of [] role in the company.

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The firm had multiple clients. The only client [] specifically recalled was the Angolan political party, UNITA. UNITA was a client of BMS and had visited the offices on one occasion.

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Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)

Not all lobbyists at BMS had foreign clients.

[] did not have any specific recollection related to how seriously BMS principals took FARA.

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[] the firm's FARA filings at some point in time. [] recalled that this involved filing forms with DOJ on a quarterly basis. []

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [] Date drafted 08/24/2018

by []

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[redacted]
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted] on 8
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /23/2018 . On 08/23/2018 . Page 2 of 3

After leaving the firm, [redacted]
[redacted]

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For financial information, [redacted] would have reached out to [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] did not recall the FARA unit visiting BMS's offices to review files. [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] would address the firm's FARA-related questions to [redacted] if she did not know the answer.

b6
b7CMANAFORT

MANAFORT worked substantially from the BMS offices.

MANAFORT [redacted] during [redacted] tenure [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] did not recall any specific interactions with MANAFORT about FARA filings.

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b7CEX CD10

[redacted] did not recall this document.

b6
b7CEX CD11

[redacted] did not recall this document but explained that it would have been brought to her.

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[redacted] did not recall filing for the project.

EX CD12

This document did not look familiar. FARA forms were legal size and this document was letter-sized.

[redacted] referred to [redacted]

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This document seemed familiar based on the content of the filing.

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] on 8
Continuation of FD-302 of /23/2018 . On 08/23/2018 . Page 3 of 3


EX CD15

[REDACTED] did not recall this document.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3182

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/04/2019

SA [] and SA [] interviewed [] at the law offices of [] in Alexandria, Virginia. [] was represented by []. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [] provided the following information:

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[] recalled that he had interactions with the Department of Justice in connection with a review of Black, Manafort & Stone's (BMS) FARA filings. FARA investigators came to the office to review documents. [] did not recall how BMS produced records for the review. [] understood this review to be a routine review for the purpose of compliance. [] understood that the cure for BMS's issues would likely have been to file amendments.

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[] did not recall seeing news at the time of the investigation about PAUL MANAFORT's dual role as an appointed OPIC director and a foreign lobbyist. [] likewise did not recall conversations with the Department of Justice regarding MANAFORT.

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b7CEX JD01

[] did not recall this document.

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b7CEX JD04*Page 2*

[] did not recall this document. Because the document referenced criminal matters, [] believed that [] may have been involved.

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[] did not recall this document.

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[] did not recall a discussion about a criminal investigation of MANAFORT.

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Investigation on 08/23/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [] Date drafted 08/27/2018

by []

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] on 8/23
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/23/2018, Page 2 of 2

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FBI(19cv1278)-3184

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

FELIX EHRAT, Group General Counsel of NOVARTIS AG (NOVARTIS), was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein via video teleconference at NOVARTIS' New York office, 230 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10169. EHRAT was accompanied by Shannon Klinger, NOVARTIS' Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and Head of Litigation. Also present were NOVARTIS outside counsel, [REDACTED] from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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Prior to NOVARTIS, EHRAT [REDACTED] EHRAT joined NOVARTIS in or about October 2011 as Group General Counsel. EHRAT was also a member of NOVARTIS' Executive Committee. As Group General Counsel, EHRAT was responsible for the legal affairs of the company, including regulatory affairs.

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NOVARTIS had hundreds, if not thousands, of consultants. EHRAT was not normally involved in the hiring process of consultants. However, EHRAT was involved when the Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or other senior individuals in the company were looking to enter into a consulting relationship. EHRAT was involved, in part, to determine whether or not a consulting contract was material to NOVARTIS.

Prior to JOE JIMENEZ bringing MICHAEL COHEN's name to EHRAT's attention, EHRAT was fairly certain he had heard COHEN's name before. EHRAT did not recall COHEN's name specifically, but EHRAT read the papers and watched the news, specifically around the time of the 2016 United States (U.S.) Presidential election. As such, EHRAT believed he became aware of COHEN's name around the November 2016 time.

JIMENEZ brought COHEN's name to EHRAT's attention on February 13, 2017 by way of an email. Prior to this interview, EHRAT went back and looked at his agenda and noted that he had a one-on-one with JIMENEZ just prior to February 13, 2017. EHRAT could not recall if JIMENEZ mentioned his relationship with COHEN during the one-on-one. EHRAT thought JIMENEZ

Investigation on 11/13/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/22/2017by SA [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat , On 11/13/2017 , Page 2 of 7

probably did because JIMENEZ would have given EHRAT a heads up prior to the February 13, 2017 email. However, EHRAT simply could not remember JIMENEZ mentioning COHEN's name during the one-on-one.

JIMENEZ wanted consulting relationships, so EHRAT was sure he was involved in the hiring process of other consultants besides MICHAEL COHEN.

Policy matters had a huge impact on NOVARTIS' business. After receiving the aforementioned email from JIMENEZ about COHEN, EHRAT spoke to JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ told EHRAT that COHEN was recommended to him by a friend. EHRAT did not know who JIMENEZ's friend was. [REDACTED]

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JIMENEZ believed COHEN could help NOVARTIS if the policy declarations being made by the DONALD TRUMP administration became law or new regulations.

[REDACTED] was both unusual and not unusual. It was unusual in that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Regarding the unrelated issue, NOVARTIS was having serious conversations with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) about a manufacturing plant impacting NOVARTIS' business so JIMENEZ was trying to secure resources to help NOVARTIS. As a result, JIMENEZ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Similarly, the February 2017 time frame was a period of high alert for NOVARTIS, so from that perspective, it was not unusual for [REDACTED] The policy declarations being made by the TRUMP administration in the February 2017 time frame could have had a significant impact in NOVARTIS' most important market, the U.S.

JIMENEZ worked in the U.S. and had a close network in the U.S. For example, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] JIMENEZ knew [REDACTED] of the law firm and wanted to start a consulting relationship with the firm. NOVARTIS had not had a previous relationship with the law firm.

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EHRAT did not recall the specifics of his conversation with JIMENEZ regarding how COHEN could help NOVARTIS. However, in looking back at his emails, EHRAT noted that the agenda he had put together in advance of a March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN included items such as pricing issues,

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat , On 11/13/2017 , Page 3 of 7

border tax, and legal matters. As such, EHRAT believed his conversation with JIMENEZ about what COHEN could do for NOVARTIS was along the same lines.

From EHRAT's conversation with JIMENEZ, there was two reasons why JIMENEZ hired COHEN. COHEN knew the individuals in the TRUMP administration and how they thought. Additionally, COHEN could facilitate access to those individuals, if necessary.

EHRAT's concerns about COHEN were regarding who COHEN was, what risk was involved in hiring COHEN, and whether or not there was a clear and proper contractual relationship in place. The risk with COHEN was no different than any other consultant. EHRAT wanted to know COHEN's track record and professional reputation. After JIMENEZ told EHRAT about COHEN, EHRAT performed a GOOGLE search on COHEN. COHEN was very much in the public debate. There was a fair share of negative press about COHEN. EHRAT did not take everything in the news at face value, given NOVARTIS was in the news every day.

COHEN's proximity to TRUMP made EHRAT more careful in figuring out what issues existed with having COHEN on retainer. EHRAT ensured there was a proper contractual relationship in place. Additionally, EHRAT wanted to get to know COHEN personally. Regarding bribery, EHRAT did not have any specific concerns about COHEN. EHRAT brought up bribery issues with COHEN in the abstract, but EHRAT was not specifically concerned about bribery issues with COHEN.

Prior to meeting COHEN, COHEN did not say anything about his access or ability to influence TRUMP. Had COHEN said something to that effect, EHRAT would not have met with COHEN. From EHRAT's perspective, that was a quid pro quo. EHRAT had two safeguards in place to ensure that did not happen; a proper contract and a face-to-face meeting with COHEN.

[REDACTED] was involved in the contract with COHEN because [REDACTED] was a NOVARTIS U.S. lawyer and the contract was a U.S. contract.

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Confidentiality of consulting relationships was something EHRAT practiced in the normal course of business. EHRAT [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Given the environment at the time, there was a heightened sense of confidentiality regarding COHEN. However, EHRAT stressed maintaining confidentiality was typical for all confidential matters.

Regarding the statement of work NOVARTIS prepared for its relationship with COHEN, EHRAT was okay with the final agreed-upon statement of work. In order to make it more broad, COHEN edited down the statement of work

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat , On 11/13/2017 , Page 4 of 7

from what NOVARTIS originally provided COHEN. While COHEN's scope of work needed some sort of framework, NOVARTIS wanted to keep it open because they did not know what was going to happen in the TRUMP administration. For that reason, NOVARTIS wanted to have an open relationship with COHEN that would develop over time. As a result, EHRAT was not concerned with COHEN editing down the statement of work and making it more broad.

The first email EHRAT received from JIMENEZ referenced COHEN's statement of work.

When EHRAT first reviewed the contract between NOVARTIS and COHEN, it was clear to EHRAT that the relationship with COHEN was [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The contract included [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EHRAT did not like it, so that language was removed.

EHRAT was not involved in the negotiations regarding COHEN's compensation of \$100,000 per month, nor did EHRAT know if there were any negotiations. JIMENEZ told EHRAT that he would be paying COHEN \$100,000 per month, but JIMENEZ did not tell EHRAT how he came to that number. EHRAT could not compare COHEN's compensation to other consultants NOVARTIS hired. It was a unique situation. EHRAT was aware that \$1.2 million per year was a lot of money. However, EHRAT noted that NOVARTIS paid hundreds of millions of dollars for outside legal advice.

On March 1, 2017, EHRAT had an in-person meeting with COHEN at NOVARTIS' New York office. Also present was TOM KENDRIS and DAN CASSERLY. The relationship with COHEN was important to EHRAT's boss, JIMENEZ, so EHRAT attached the same level of importance to the relationship. Additionally, the relationship with COHEN was going to be at least one year. EHRAT also noted that the political environment in February 2017 was interesting. For these reasons, EHRAT believed it was important he attend the meeting in person. EHRAT wanted to get a personal impression of COHEN.

Prior to the meeting, EHRAT received an email from COHEN that made EHRAT uncomfortable. As the participants were arranging for a meeting time, COHEN said [REDACTED]

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The March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN began with small talk about the TRUMP administration, but EHRAT could not recall specifically what was said. The meeting turned into a series of name dropping by COHEN. EHRAT believed COHEN wanted to show he was influential.

During the March 1, 2017 meeting, COHEN received and answered several phone calls. There may have been some calls COHEN received that he did not take. However, one of the calls COHEN took during the meeting was put on

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat , On 11/13/2017 , Page 5 of 7

speaker. EHRAT did not recall who the person was on the other line, but COHEN did not tell the person he/she was on speaker. EHRAT did not recall what the conversation between COHEN and the individual on speakerphone was about. The fact that COHEN was answering his phone during the meeting was hugely unprofessional.

As previously noted, in advance of the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, EHRAT had put together an agenda of items to discuss with COHEN, such as pricing issues, border tax, and legal matters. EHRAT emailed the agenda of items to KENDRIS. One of the legal matters EHRAT was interested in discussing with COHEN was a case NOVARTIS had in the Southern District of New York (SDNY). EHRAT was interested because [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Regarding the other agenda items, COHEN speculated about whether or not the issues would happen soon. NOVARTIS was interested in obtaining access to individuals in the TRUMP administration. EHRAT was under the assumption that COHEN could bring NOVARTIS together with certain individuals in the TRUMP administration regarding these issues.

When EHRAT met with COHEN on March 1, 2017, EHRAT asked COHEN about his relationship with individuals in the TRUMP administration. EHRAT was trying to figure out who was calling the shots. EHRAT was concerned about policy declarations made by the administration becoming law, new regulations, and/or new guidance.

NOVARTIS, as one of the leaders in its industry, had access to individuals in any administration. However, part of the potential relationship with COHEN was to facilitate meetings and relationships with the TRUMP administration.

During the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, EHRAT had the impression that COHEN did not really know what he was talking about. There was a lot of superficiality involved. Whenever EHRAT dug a little further into the technicalities of NOVARTIS' business, it was clear COHEN was not into the granularity.

During the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, COHEN suggested NOVARTIS build a manufacturing site in the U.S. COHEN said doing so would be good for NOVARTIS' standing in the country and with the TRUMP administration. EHRAT noted that the suggestion of building a manufacturing site was something EHRAT heard in almost every country visit he did. COHEN suggested building it in Indiana, as well as other places. EHRAT could not remember why COHEN suggested Indiana, but EHRAT assumed someone influential in the TRUMP administration was from Indiana. EHRAT was not entirely surprised by COHEN's suggestion.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat , On 11/13/2017 , Page 6 of 7

EHRAT's impression of COHEN during the March 1, 2017 meeting was based on COHEN's body language and how he said things. EHRAT had a sense that there was not a level of high professionalism there. After the meeting with COHEN ended, EHRAT had a download of the meeting with KENDRIS and CASSERLY. KENDRIS and CASSERLY's assessment of COHEN was very similar to EHRAT's. EHRAT, KENDRIS, and CASSERLY agreed NOVARTIS hiring COHEN was not a very good decision.

When EHRAT was first informed by JIMENEZ of COHEN's hiring, EHRAT saw some merits to JIMENEZ's decision. However, EHRAT wanted confirmation. After meeting with COHEN, EHRAT determined the merits were not very good.

After the meeting with COHEN, EHRAT provided JIMENEZ a download of the meeting and EHRAT's impressions from the meeting. EHRAT told JIMENEZ that he wanted to let the relationship with COHEN go silent for the time being. EHRAT suggested [REDACTED] JIMENEZ was disappointed. EHRAT thought JIMENEZ was surprised by how poorly the meeting with COHEN went. EHRAT speculated that JIMENEZ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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JIMENEZ did not share the substance of his conversations with COHEN with EHRAT. On a couple of occasions, JIMENEZ told EHRAT that COHEN reached out to him (JIMENEZ), but JIMENEZ did not share the substance of those conversations with EHRAT.

EHRAT had no interactions with COHEN after the March 1, 2017 meeting. From an operational level, KENDRIS and/or CASSERLY would have dealt with COHEN. As such, there was no reason for EHRAT to have additional interactions with COHEN.

In the context of NOVARTIS' relationship with COHEN, EHRAT had no recollection of [REDACTED]

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Subsequent to the March 1, 2017 meeting, the next time EHRAT had a specific recollection of COHEN's name coming up was in September 2017. JIMENEZ sent EHRAT an email about [REDACTED]

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EHRAT was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000992. EHRAT did not recall speaking with JIMENEZ about [REDACTED] prior to receiving this email. EHRAT's response, "I will gladly do so," was shorthand for EHRAT's way of saying that he would gladly look into [REDACTED] EHRAT subsequently looked into it. "Vas" was the successor CEO to JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ's effective date of his departure from NOVARTIS was February 1, 2018. EHRAT did not know if JIMENEZ spoke to VAS about COHEN.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Felix Ehrat . On 11/13/2017 . Page 7 of 7

EHRAT was shown an email Bates stamped NVS_00000993. Legally, NOVARTIS had two options to [REDACTED] with COHEN. The company could

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[REDACTED]

EHRAT did not want to [REDACTED] with COHEN. From EHRAT's perspective, it was not worth the amount of money NOVARTIS could potentially save. Additionally, the likely outcome was one in which NOVARTIS would have to [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] From that point of view, it was a business decision to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EHRAT also did not want to alienate COHEN. There was no upside to taking on the risk of making someone like COHEN unhappy. EHRAT would apply the same logic to any partnership NOVARTIS entered into. COHEN's access to the TRUMP administration was not really a concern. At the time of this email, September 12, 2017, EHRAT did not even know what COHEN's access to the TRUMP administration looked like.

During the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, COHEN said he had been very close to TRUMP, and continued to be. EHRAT was not entirely convinced of COHEN's representation about his closeness to TRUMP. EHRAT could not recall if COHEN mentioned others in the administration that he was close to, such as JARED KUSHNER.

EHRAT did not recall COHEN representing that he traveled with TRUMP. EHRAT recalled COHEN saying he had access to the White House, which EHRAT took to mean TRUMP. EHRAT did not remember COHEN mentioning Mar-a-Lago. COHEN conveyed to EHRAT, KENDRIS, and CASSERLY that he did not want to go through intermediaries to facilitate access. COHEN represented that he had direct access to TRUMP.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: All emails shown to EHRAT are included in the attached 1A envelope.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/29/2018

HOPE HICKS, date of birth [REDACTED] Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] was interviewed on December 7, 2017 at the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Special Counsel's office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. Present during the interview were HICKS' attorneys [REDACTED] FBI Special Agents (SA) [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Goldstein and Jeannie Rhee.

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At the beginning of the interview, HICKS was informed that making intentional false statements to the SAs could result in federal charges. HICKS then provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 12/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/10/2017by [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 2 of 28

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 4 of 28

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June 9, 2016 Meeting

HICKS did not know anything about the meeting [REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] on June 9, 2016

[REDACTED] to her on June 22, 2017 when she went to TRUMP's residence

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017 , On 12/07/2017 , Page 7 of 28

[REDACTED] KUSHNER and IVANKA b5 per DOJ/OIP
were already there talking to TRUMP when HICKS was called in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

KUSHNER wanted to fill TRUMP in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KUSHNER wanted to discuss something they found in the documents b5 per DOJ/OIP
they were to provide to the congressional committees. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KUSHNER was saying
[REDACTED] related to a meeting with KUSHNER, MANAFORT, and
JUNIOR. TRUMP said he didn't want to hear about it and he shut the
conversation down. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] On either June 28 or 29, [REDACTED] News reached out to HICKS wanting to meet with her. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HICKS mentioned her concerns to TRUMP about what was going to the Hill without giving him details. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TRUMP seemed to think it wouldn't leak. He [REDACTED] seemed upset there were already too many people who knew about the emails. TRUMP thought they should just have one lawyer deal with this and didn't understand why so many people already had this information. TRUMP indicated it would leak now that everyone has it.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

KUSHNER, IVANKA and HICKS went to [REDACTED] to talk to TRUMP.

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[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[redacted] and explained there were emails setting
up a meeting. [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
TRUMP told them not to go to the press. [redacted]
[redacted] TRUMP didn't want to know anything about it. TRUMP didn't think the
emails would be leaked to the press and said to let [redacted] give them to
who he needed to give them to. [redacted]

[redacted] HICKS said she just kept telling him they b6
were "really bad." [redacted] b7C

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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HICKS told TRUMP the New York Times knew about the documents and they were about to release a story. [REDACTED] such a problem. [REDACTED]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] TRUMP told HICKS not to respond to the story which HICKS thought was odd since TRUMP usually considered not responding to be the ultimate sin. TRUMP asked HICKS to confirm this meeting was about Russian adoption to which she confirmed that's what she thought it was about. TRUMP told her to just respond with the fact it was about Russian adoption. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 11 of 28

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

TRUMP said "no" to the statement and told HICKS they were saying too much. TRUMP told HICKS not to explain so much but just say he took a brief meeting and it was about Russian adoption. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 12 of 28

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TRUMP told her, "You've given a statement. We're done."

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 13 of 28

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017 , On 12/07/2017 , Page 14 of 28

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 16 of 28

[REDACTED] b7A per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b7A per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED] b7A per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017 , On 12/07/2017 , Page 17 of 28

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017 , On 12/07/2017 , Page 19 of 28

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 24 of 28

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b7A

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Hope Hicks interview 12/07/2017, On 12/07/2017, Page 28 of 28


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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/22/2018

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Donald McGahn, White House Counsel, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street NE, Washington, D.C. McGahn was accompanied by his attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted] of Quinn Emanuel. Present for the interview were Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. McGahn was advised it is crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, McGahn provided the following information:

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Investigation on 11/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/13/2017
by [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 2 of 19

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 3 of 19

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b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 4 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 5 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b3
b7E

X

(U) Yates told McGahn Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b3
b7E

(S)

(S)

 McGahn asked Yates if the FBI agents had "really pinned him down." Her response led him to believe Flynn was not in trouble.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 6 of 19

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] (S)

(S)

X [redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b3
b7E

[redacted] McGahn's "opening salvo" was that the Acting Attorney General had come by to talk about Flynn. He tried to recount what Yates had told him. [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

X [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 7 of 19

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) b1
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b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) Trump instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to figure things out. He also instructed they keep the matter between them. [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] McGahn mentioned the Logan Act to Trump. [REDACTED] McGahn told Trump about the FBI interview of Flynn, [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED] so McGahn

(S)

assessed there was no clear 1001 violation. Trump asked about 1001, and McGahn explained the violation to him. He also explained the Logan Act, [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 8 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

X

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

January 27, 2017

(U) On January 27, 2017, the next day, Eisenberg relayed to McGahn his view that, based on the information provided, Flynn Logan Act,

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) (X) Yates came back to speak to McGahn at his request later that day.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) b1
b3
b7E(S)b1
b3
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) At some point early on, but McGahn was not sure when, he talked to Trump about the proper way to communicate with DOJ. McGahn told Trump the President does not call DOJ directly and it usually goes through the WHCO.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Having that framework prevents the White House from "nosing in" on investigations.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

[redacted]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 10 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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b3
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

(S)

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 11 of 19

 b5 Per DOJ/OIP b5 Per DOJ/OIPb1
b3
b7E

(S)

(S)

 Flynn told them he had been interviewed by the FBI but the FBI told him the investigation was winding down and was over.
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)b1
b3
b7E
FBI(19cv1278)-3240

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 12 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP
b5 Per DOJ/OIP (S)b1
b3
b7E

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X

b5 Per DOJ/OIP McGahn thought Flynn's time was up. b1
b3
b7E (S) McGahn thought there was no way Flynn did not know he had talked about sanctions on the calls.
b5 Per DOJ/OIP At that point, both Priebus and McGahn wanted Flynn to go,

(S)

X

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb1
b3
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3241

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 13 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3242

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 14 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

X [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3243

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 15 of 19

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

Attorney General Sessions' recusal

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
FBI(19cv1278)-3244

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 16 of 19 b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) McGahn believed Trump called him on the morning of March 2, 2017.

 Trump b5 Per DOJ/OIP wanted him to get in touch with Sessions to tell him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation. b5 Per DOJ/OIP b5 Per DOJ/OIP To Trump, recusal could be a concession of having made a mistake in his testimony. Recusal made Sessions look guilty. b5 Per DOJ/OIP b5 Per DOJ/OIP~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 11/30/2017 , Page 17 of 19b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) Trump seemed to be saying that to the extent there was an investigation that could hobble the presidency, the Attorney General could help keep policy objectives from being derailed

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) When McGahn spoke to Sessions, Sessions said he would follow the rules.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) Trump did not want Sessions to recuse

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 18 of 19b5 Per DOJ/OIP(U) McGahn and Sessions had another conversation that day. b5 Per DOJ/OIPMcGahn thought he talked to [Senate Majority Leader] Mitch McConnell at some point that day and informed him where they were regarding Sessions' recusal. McGahn said it was possible he called Sessions again after the McConnell call. b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP(U) McGahn and Sessions had another call and discussed resignation and recusal. b5 Per DOJ/OIP(U) The notes referenced (SCR015_000023), Sessions' personal lawyer. McGahn wanted to know what if had any helpful insight. b5 Per DOJ/OIPb6
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn . On 11/30/2017 . Page 19 of 19b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) "No comms/serious concerns about obstruction" (SCR015_000025) was probably McGahn expressing concerns about obstruction if the press team went out saying "crazy things." He wanted to make sure they did not try to spin it.

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/23/2018

Donald McGahn, White House Counsel, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street NE, Washington, D.C. McGahn was accompanied by his attorneys, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of Quinn Emmanuel. Present for the interview were Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, McGahn provided the following information:

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 12/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/19/2017by [REDACTED]b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 2 of 15

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 3 of 15

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Appointment of Special Counsel

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] appointing a special b5 Per DOJ/OIP
counsel, which took place while they were talking to potential FBI
directors. [REDACTED] Sessions,
[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/14/2017 , Page 4 of 15

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] asked

Sessions to call Rosenstein.

[REDACTED] Sessions, who had returned, started to try to explain b5 Per DOJ/OIP
to Trump what Rosenstein had done. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told Trump Rosenstein had appointed Mueller special counsel.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 5 of 15

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 7 of 15

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handle the special coun:b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 8 of 15

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Discussions about Flynn:

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump said he did not say he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added he was "allowed to hope." [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] Trump did not think he had crossed any lines. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/14/2017 , Page 9 of 15

Shortly after the Special Counsel was appointed, the White House received a document hold request from the FBI, [REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] two FBI agents, who walked into the WHCO and gave the letter

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Upon receipt of the letter, McGahn issued a document hold to the staff as a follow on to the previous hold. He instructed staff not to send out any of their burn bags over the weekend while he sorted things out.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Sessions:

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

At that point, Trump was pretty down on Sessions in general and it would often come up that he was not happy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Trump [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed his displeasure with Sessions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 10 of 15

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Resignation:

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

In mid-June 2017, McGahn told Priebus and Bannon he was "out." Trump called him multiple times the Saturday of Father's Day weekend [REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP [REDACTED] Trump wanted McGahn to call Rosenstein and tell him to fire Mueller. Trump wanted McGahn to tell Rosenstein there was a conflict of interest between Trump and Mueller [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/14/2017 , Page 11 of 15

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn told Priebus not to do it [REDACTED] McGahn told Priebus he wanted to consult his personal attorney and recommended Priebus do the same. McGahn thought he told Priebus if Trump ordered him to fire Sessions he would resign. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] McGahn said the bottom line was if Trump wanted them to fire Sessions, and neither would do it, they may have to quit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] He did recall "some semblance of" a discussion regarding the fact that the Special Counsel would report directly to a non-recused Attorney General. If Sessions left and a new AG was in place, Mueller and his team would report to the new AG. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] McGahn offered the opinion things may not change much if a new AG was in place.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 12 of 15

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 13 of 15

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b4 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/14/2017, Page 14 of 15

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn has talked to Trump about Manafort since he has been the White House Counsel. They have talked about Manafort's role in the Russia investigation. They "sort of talked" about whether Manafort had any information potentially harmful to Trump. [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/14/2017 , Page 15 of 15

[REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP